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ESSAY
EXPLORING SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY
PAUL FINKELMANI
/-JIe may see the office of historical research as that of ex-
plaining and therefore lightening the pressure that the past
must exercise upon the present and the present upon the fu-
ture. Today we study the day before yesterday, in order that
yesterday may not paralyze to-day, and to-day may not para-
lyze to-morrow.
-Frederic Maitland*
Whether the South has a distinct legal history has not been ade-
quately explored by scholar In this essay, Professor Paul Finkelman
discusses southern legal history through an examination of race rela-
tions, violence, crime, legal institutions, and legal culture, concluding
that marked differences exist between northern legal history and south-
ern legal history. By highlighting the many unanswered questions con-
cerning the South's legal heritage, Professor Finkelman invites and
encourages scholars to engage in research that will relieve the South of
"the pressure [its] past must exetcise upon" it today.
Stanford Law School's Lawrence M. Friedman has recently noted: "Amer-
ican legal history. . . is booming."' Legal history now is taught at most major
law schools, by historians as well as lawyers. Sitting judges somehow have
found time to publish works concerning legal history.2 West Publishing Com-
pany has stamped its approval on the trend with the publication of the casebook
t Assistant Professor of History, State University of New York at Binghamton. A.B. 1971,
Syracuse; M.A. 1972, Ph.D. 1976, University of Chicago; Fellow in Law and History, Harvard Law
School, 1982-83.
* Maitland, A Survey of the Century, in M THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WIL-
LIAM MArrLAND 438-39 (1911).
1. Friedman, American Legal History: Past and Present, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 563, 563 (1984).
The growth of interest in legal history has led to a small explosion in scholarship. Most major
law reviews have devoted space to articles that are historical in focus. Many were written by aca-
demic historians rather than by law faculty. Even student notes in law reviews occasionally are
historical. Two journals, LAW AND HISToRY REvIEw, published by the Cornell Law School, and
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HisToRy, published by the Temple University Law School,
provide a regular forum for articles on legal history. STumES IN LEGAL HSToRY is a series of
publications sponsored by the American Society for Legal History and the University of North
Carolina Press. Other publishers, both university and commerical, are active in this field. It is
possible that we are in the middle of a "golden age" of legal history.
2. See, eg., E. DumaAULD, THE LFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HuGo GROTIus (1969); A.
HIGGIHOTrHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978);
Whichard, A Place for Walter Clark in the American Judicial Tradition, 63 N.C.L. REv. 287 (1985).
Dumbauld is a Senior District Judge on the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania; Higginbotham is a Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit; and Whichard is an Associate Judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
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Law and American History.3 All of this suggests more than mere antiquarian
interest in legal history. Scholars, practitioners, and judges have begun to real-
ize that through legal history they can better understand the law they study,
practice, and apply.
Many scholars have begun to examine what role regionalism-particularly
southern regionalism-has played in the growth of American law.4 All scholars
would readily agree that there is a distinctive southern history. Scholars are
uncertain, however, whether a distinctive southern legal history exists. Certain
aspects of the historical development of law in the South-the law of slavery and
segregation-clearly differ from the general development of law in the North.
Similarly, the South has had a distinct history of local legislation and case law
on matters of particular relevance to the region, such as the regulation of the
cotton gin in the nineteenth century. It is unclear, however, to what extent these
local concerns affected southern legal developments.
I. LEGAL HISTORY FROM A NORTHERN VIEW
Most published scholarship in legal history has focused on the North-
especially Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin.5
The best early legal history focused on northern states and jurisdictions. The
Handlins' classic study of Massachusetts, 6 Goebel and Naughton's study of
criminal law in the New York colony, 7 and Louis Hartz's work on Penn-
sylvania 8 laid the groundwork for later books and articles on legal history.
3. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISToRY (1980).
4. For the most recent publications, see AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISrORY OF THE
SOUTH (D. Bodenhamer & J. Ely eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as AMBIVALENT LEGACY] and Sym-
posium on the LegalHistory of the South, 32 YAND. L. REv. 1 (1979). The fiftieth anniversary of the
Southern Historical Association, celebrated in November 1984, underscores the importance of
Southern history to American history.
5. In Kermit Hall's five-volume work, A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN
CONSTIruTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, 1896-1979 (1984), only one southern state, Virginia, has
more than 400 entries, though five northern states have that many. Wisconsin's importance to legal
history is due to the influence of J. Willard Hurst, the prolific teacher and writer of legal history at
the University of Wisconsin School of Law. As one scholar has recently noted, "of the major tradi-
tions in American legal history... clearly the most important... is that begun after World War
IH by James Willard Hurst at the University of Wisconsin Law School." Katz, The Problem of a
Colonial Legal History, in COLONIAL BRITmSH AMERICA: ESSAYS IN THE NEw HISTORY OF THE
EARLY MODERN ERA 457, 464 (3. Greene & J. Pole eds. 1984).
6. 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERN-
MENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (rev. ed. 1969). K. HALL, supra
note 5, contains 928 entries for Massachusetts, including some of the major works in American legal
history. The presence of major graduate research institutions (Harvard, Brandeis, and others), of the
old and established Massachusetts Historical Society, of easily accessible state records and archives,
and of other research facilities such as the Boston Public Library has no doubt contributed to the
vast literature on the legal history of Massachusetts.
7. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1944). K.
HALL, supra note 5, contains 980 entries for New York. Just as in Massachusetts, see supra note 6,
major graduate research institutions (Columbia, Cornell, New York University, and others), the
New York Historical Society, the New York Public Library, and an abundance of records have
contributed to the literature on New York's legal history.
8. L. HARTz, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNsYLVANIA, 1776-1860
(1948). Pennsylvania, with over 500 entries in K. HALL, supra note 5, ranks fourth among the states
in number of entries. Virginia ranks third. A tradition of graduate training, the Historical Society of
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There are no comparable studies of southern states.
The absence of early studies of southern legal history may have influenced
later scholars. From reading Grant Gilmore one would assume that the South,
southern judges, and southern law played absolutely no part in the various ages
of American law.9 Gilmore discusses nineteenth century American legal his-
tory-the "Golden Age of American Law"' Q-without mentioning a southern
state judge. Even his brief treatment of slavery and the law ignores southern
jurisprudence and focuses entirely on how northern judges dealt with that insti-
tution.1 ' Moreover, Gilmore pays tribute to Joseph Story and James Kent for
their treatises, 12 but seems unaware of St. George Tucker's first American edi-
tion of Blackstone,' 3 Samuel Livermore's first American treatise on the conflict
of laws, 14 and Henry St. George Tucker's Commentaries on the Laws of
Virginia.'5
Morton Horwitz' prize winning book, The Transformation of American
Law, 1780-1860,16 is based almost entirely on evidence from northern states.
1 7
Although its title implies a treatment of the law of the entire nation, the book is
about the transformation of law in the North. The question whether the South
participated in the transformation remains unanswered. If the law in the South
was transformed, the transformation was truly American; if southerners resisted
these changes, the transformation was not American, but northern. Even if the
South accepted some of the transformation, it is unclear whether these changes
affected slavery or if slavery affected the changes.' 8 Horwitz wrote about a pe-
riod when the great political, social, and legal issues focused oil slavery. The
word slave, however, does not appear in the index to his book.19
Pennsylvania, the Library Company of Philadelphia, and the availability of records have led to a
great deal of literature on Pennsylvania.
9. G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
10. C. HAAR, THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERcAN LAW (1965). Gilmore calls this period "The
Age of Discovery," G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 19-40, and admits his description of it "sound[s]
like a romp through the Garden of Eden." Id. at 41. Few scholars, it seems, can resist such descrip-
tions of the jurisprudence of Marshall, the scholarship of Story and Kent, and the power of Taney.
11. G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 36-39.
12. Id. at 27-30.
13. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WrrH NoTEs OF REFERENCE TO Ti CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNrrED STATEs; AND OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF VIRGiNIA (S. Tucker ed. Philadelphia 1803) (five volume work).
14. S. LVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARI-
ETY OF THE PoSrrIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (New Orleans 1828).
15. H. TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, (Winchester, Va. 1831) (two
volume work).
16. M. HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
17. Almost all of Horwitz' material comes from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania.
For example, in his chapter on the transformation of property law, Horwitz cites cases from the 15
slave states 28 times. Id. at 274-88. In contrast, there are over 65 citations to Massachusetts cases
and over 60 citations to cases from five other northeastern states.
18. One attempt to evaluate how the transformation of the law affected slavery is Mark
Tushnet's THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HuMANIT AND
INTEREST (1981). Tushnet's work has many problems, but it is nevertheless an important first step.
See Fede, Toward a Solution of the Slave Law Dilemma: A Critique of Tushnet's 'The American Law
of Slavery,' 2 LAW & Hist. REV. 301 (1984).
19. The only discussion of slavery in Horwitz' book concerns masters' tort liability for the acts
of their slaves. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 16, at 92-93. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
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Horwitz is not alone in neglecting the South. The work of J. Willard Hurst,
the dean of American legal history, has centered mostly on Wisconsin.20
Hurst's most interesting work, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nine-
teenth-Century United States,2 1 seldom mentions the South. Although the book
explores economic developments and their relation to law, Hurst fails to men-
tion the southern economy; slavery-the mainstay of that economy-is absent
from his history.
G. Edward White's The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading
American Judges22 is similar in disregard of the South. White depicts the Amer-
ican judicial tradition as a federal and northern phenomenon. 23 The only
southerners who appear in White's book are Supreme Court justices, who, in a
sense, had ceased to be southern. White finds that Justice John Marshall
Harlan's claim to greatness is based on his rejection of his southern roots and his
opposition to the constitutionalization of southern racism and segregation.24 In
20. See J.W. HuRST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950); J.W.
HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN
WISCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964); J.W. Hupsr, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED
STATES (1977) [hereinafter cited as J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER].
21. J.W. HURSr, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES (1956).
22. See G.E. WHrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERI-
CAN JUDGES (1976) [hereinafter cited as G.E. WHrrE, JUDICIAL TRADITION].
23. See G.E. WHITE, JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 22 (study of leading appellate judges).
White's important state judges come from New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Michigan,
and California. White profiles James Kent, Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand and Jerome Frank of
New York; Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts; Thonas Cooley of Michigan; Charles Doe of New
Hampshire; and Roger Traynor of California. Besides Cardozo, two other Supreme Court Justices
profiled in the book sat on state supreme courts-Holmes of Massachusetts and Field of California.
Of the 26 men discussed by White, only five-Marshall, Taney, Harlan, McReynolds, and Black-
were from the South; none served on major courts in the South. Black served as a police court judge
in Alabama; Marshall and Taney rode circuit in southern states as United States Supreme Court
justices. Taney's most famous circuit opinion, Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861), was
essentially a southern, prosecessionist opinion that failed to command the respect of the Lincoln
administration and eventually tarnished Taney's reputation. White's treatment of the American
judiciary suggests that state judges are important only if they come from the North and that United
States Supreme Court justices from the South can become important only if they reject their
southernness.
White also ignores the South and southern jurisprudence in his TORT LAw IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980).
24. Justice Harlan's greatness also resulted from the knowledge and experience he gained from
his slave holding past and his post-Civil War residence in the South. Harlan's experience in the
South is similar to that of another great southern justice, Hugo Black. The key to both men's oppo-
sition to segregation was their southern background. Both men understood how segregation had
corrupted and undermined democratic society. Harlan's important dissents, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 538, 552-64 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-62
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting), were possible only because Harlan was a southerner. In Plessy
Harlan wrote from first-hand experience: "[It seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a
dominant race-a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights,
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan rejected the legal fiction of separate but equal treatment because he knew its failings. Unlike
the Plessy majority, Harlan had lived with slavery and segregation, and he knew that "[t]he arbitrary
separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Consti-
tution." Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan recognized that "[t]he thin disguise of 'equal'
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the
wrong this day done." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In his concurring opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J.,
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contrast, Taney's great failure as a Supreme Court justice was the Dred Scott
case,25 in which Taney acted as a southerner, rather than as a nationalist.
26 If
there is a distinctly southern judicial tradition, even one that has been over-
turned by the force of events27 or by the Supreme Court, it is a tradition that
White ignores.
28
More specialized studies are equally oriented toward the North. No work
of judicial biography compares with Leonard Levy's masterful study of Massa-
chusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw.29 Shaw's historical reputation as the most
important state judge of the nineteenth century is partly attributable to Levy's
book. Similar research on southern judges is needed to determine whether the
South produced jurists of Shaw's caliber and influence. 30 Furthermore, because
scholars know very little about doctrinal legal history in the South, it is unclear
how much Shaw and other northern judges influenced southern jurisprudence3 x
or if southern jurists actually influenced northerners.
There are many other examples. William E. Nelson's book The Americani-
zation of the Common Law32 focuses entirely on Massachusetts. 33 The only
book-length study of codification 34 makes only passing reference to the Georgia
concurring), Justice Black argued, based on his personal knowledge of Alabama politics, that Sulli-
van could not have suffered any political damage even if the newspaper advertisement at issue actu-
ally had libeled him. "Viewed realistically, this record lends support to an inference that instead of
being damaged Commissioner Sullivan's political, social, and financial prestige has likely been en-
hanced by the Times' publication." Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring). Black's majority opinion in
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), similarly reflects his southern background. In Chambers
the Court overturned the murder convictions of four blacks who had pled guilty after being held
incommunicado for five days in a Florida jail. Perhaps only a lawyer native to the deep South could
write of blacks "who have suffered most from secret and dictatorial proceedings" leading to sunrise
confessions and quick convictions. Id. at 238.
25. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
26. See G.E. WHrrE, JUDICIAL TRADrTON, supra note 22, at 82-83.
27. The "events" included secession-the south's greatest experiment in constitutional the-
ory-and Lincoln's successful efforts to uphold his constitutional duty to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States." U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. For a discussion of the
history of secession, see H. HYMAN & W. WIEcEK, EQUAL JUSnCE UNDER LAW: CoNSTrITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982) (discussing the pre-Civil War, Civil War, and Recon-
struction periods).
28. White's book is patterned after Richard Hofstadter's THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADI-
TION (rev. ed. 1973). Hofstadter, however, recognizes the importance of a southern political tradi-
tion in his chapter on John C. Calhoun. Id. at 86-117.
29. L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
30. The obvious candidate for a book similar to Levy's is Thomas Ruffin, former chief justice of
the North Carolina Supreme Court. A good example of the kind of work that needs to be done is
Judge Willis P. Whichard's recent article on North Carolina's premier chief justice in the twentieth
century, Walter Clark. See Whichard, supra note 2.
31. Shaw is not the only northern judge who should be examined. There is some evidence that
James Kent's chancery opinions were well received in South Carolina. See G.E. WI-ra, JUDIIcAL
TRADITION, supra note 22, at 44-45. It is equally important to know whether northern judges cited
their southern counterparts.
32. W. NELsoN, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
33. The implications of Nelson's title are important. Could a similar study of common law in
North Carolina or Virginia be given such a title? It is unlikely that most scholars would view a
tradition of legal changes in a southern jurisdiction as an "Americanization" of the law.
34. C. COoK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM
LEGAL REFORM (1981). Cook's chapter on "Developing National Patterns" is devoted almost en-
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code that was authorized in 1858 and finally adopted in 186335 and makes no
reference at all to Georgia's criminal code of 1816, "the first of its kind in the
country." 36 The growing body of work on women's legal history also adopts a
generally northern perspective.37 Two recent books on married women's prop-
erty acts focus on New York;38 no similar work has appeared on the first mar-
ried women's property act, passed in Mississippi in 1839,39 or on the provision
to protect married women's property in the 1845 Texas Constitution. 4°
Work on legal education and the changing nature of the bar has also fo-
cused on the North. William R. Johnson's book on the growth of legal educa-
tion and its relationship to the bar deals only with Wisconsin.4 1 Johnson
demonstrates that the demand for academic certification of lawyers through ed-
ucational institutions stemmed in part from a hostility toward non-English im-
tirely to Massachusetts. In only one chapter does Cook examine a southern state. Curiously he
chooses South Carolina, where the codification movement "failed utterly." Id. at 121.
35. Id. at 198. Indeed, Cook's book does not even indicate when the code, THE CODE OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA (1861) (codified by R. Clark, T. Cobb, & D. Irwin), became effective. Although
the imprint date was 1861, the code was not published until 1862 and did not go into effect until
January 1, 1863, which was "twenty days ... after Thomas Cobb was killed at the battle of Freder-
icksburg." W. McCAsH, THOMAS R.R. COBB: THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN NATIONALIST 65
(1983).
36. W. McCASH, supra note 35, at 58; see also Surrency, The First American Criminal Code
The Georgia Code of 1816, 63 GA. HIST. Q. 420 (1979) (discussing the Georgia Penal Code of 1816
and comparing it with criminal laws in other states). For a discussion of the Georgia Code of 1863,
often called the "Cobb Code," see W. McCAsH, supra note 35, at 57-67.
37. There are some exceptions. Zainaldin, The Emergence ofa Modern American Family Law:
Child Custody, Adoption and the Court 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038 (1979), uses evidence
from throughout the nation. Salmon, Women and Property in South Carolina:" The Evidence from
Marriage Settlements, 39 WM. & MARY L.Q. 655 (1982), and Censer, Smiling Through Her Tearm
Ante-Bellum Southern Women and Divorce, 25 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 24 (1981), both focus on the
South.
Divorce law should prove a fruitful topic for those interested in southern legal history. There is
no clear pattern in the South. South Carolina refused to allow divorce until the middle of the twenti-
eth century, while Tennessee adopted a divorce statute in 1799. Lawrence Friedman asserts that
divorce in the nineteenth century was more available in the North than in the South. L. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82 (1973). Thus, a distinct difference in statutory law and
judicial decisions may have developed between the North and the South on this issue. The best work
on the subject is N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1962). Michael Hindus has made some useful observations about divorce in ante-bellum
South Carolina, but that state clearly was different from all other states on this issue. See M.
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETrS AND
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 50-53 (1980). For criticism of this book and a discussion of the
problem of divorce in South Carolina, see Finkelman, Book Review, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1485
(1981).
38. N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTuRY NEW YORK (1982); P. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: TIlE LEGAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF FEMALE EMANCIPATION (1980).
39. Act of Feb. 15, 1839, ch. 26, 1839 Miss. Laws 920. The Act was entitled "An Act for the
protection and preservation of the rights and property of married women."
40. The Texas Constitution of 1845 stated:
All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage,
and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her separate property; and
laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her
separate property, as that held in common with her husband. Laws shall also be passed
providing for the registration of the wife's separate property.
TEx CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 19.




migrants, who were entering the legal profession to the dismay of older members
of the bar. This theory helps explain why Wisconsin and other northeastern and
midwestern states willingly embraced mandatory legal education, but it fails to
explain why the South, which had relatively few immigrants, also adopted
mandatory legal education.
Equally unknown is how and why law schools developed in the South. A
recent history of American law schools42 centers on the development of legal
education at Harvard University and the case method of legal study begun there
by Dean Langdell in 1873. The study notes that "large state universities in the
South began to succumb" to the case method beginning in the 1920s. 43 An
opponent of the method at the University of North Carolina complained that its
adoption at most schools was "due not so much to any merit in the system as to
the fact that it is a system adopted by Harvard University." 44 The reasons for
southern opposition to Harvard Law School's intellectual imperialism deserve
further study.
Authors who have attempted to include the South in American legal his-
tory have achieved mixed results. Although Presser and Zainaldin include the
South in their casebook on American legal history,45 most of their material
comes from New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. The book contains
only scattered cases from Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama, and Missis-
sippi.46 Lawrence M. Friedman uses examples from the South to illustrate
points throughout his A History ofAmerican Law.47 Friedman, more than any-
one else, has integrated the South into American legal history. Even Friedman's
work, however, is limited by the paucity of monographic work on southern legal
developments and the failure of other scholars to use southern materials in their
studies of specialized topics. As Friedman has noted, with the exception of slav-
ery, the legal history of the South in both the colonial period and the nineteenth
century "is badly neglected."'48
II. WHY ONLY NORTHERN LEGAL HISTORY?
Three possible conclusions may be drawn from the preceding survey. First,
most legal historians may have lived or studied in the North, and their scholar-
ship may merely reflect their location.49 If this premise is correct, then the
42. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980s (1983).
43. Id. at 191-92.
44. Id. at 192.
45. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 3.
46. Id. at 221-31, 337-41, 235-38, 288-91, 788-89, 813-19. There is also a long section on slav-
ery and law which surprisingly includes only one southern state case, State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2
Dev.) 263 (1829), and one Supreme Court case that originated in the South, Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 3, at 442-509. This section
also includes two northern cases on slavery, Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836),
and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The rest of the section is devoted to ex-
cerpts from secondary literature.
47. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37.
48. Friedman, supra note 1, at 575.
49. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. For other examples of the Wisconsin school
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growing number of legal historians at southern institutions may soon conduct
studies to determine whether law in the South developed in tandem with law in
the North.
A second hypothesis is that the most important legal developments since
1775 actually occurred in the North. Under this view, southern legal history is
underdeveloped because the South lacks a distinctive legal history. This thesis
suggests that legal changes began in the North and were adopted by the rest of
the nation. Because followers rarely are as interesting as leaders, this premise
would explain why the South, a follower, has been ignored.50 Jamil Zainaldin's
excellent study of child custody and adoption supports this thesis, concluding
that in the ante-bellum period "[s]outhern courts embraced the developments in
the North."''s Zainaldin's characterization, however, differs from those of most
other legal historians because he has carefully examined southern cases and stat-
utes as well as the law of New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Similar
work in other areas of the law may prove the validity of this thesis.
A third possible conclusion is that many legal historians have ignored the
South on the assumption that nothing really important or influential happened
there. This view would be a version of Whig history-only history's winners
need be studied. According to this thesis, legal change should be studied only if
it leads to present day developments. Under this view, if the South did not
change in the direction of progress, its legal history is not worth studying.5 2
The value of these three explanations will remain unclear until more work
has been done in southern legal history. Scholars must investigate and explain
the dynamics of legal change and continuity in the North and the South, and
must study the interaction between the regions' development before the true na-
ture of American legal history can be known.
III. DEFNING THE SOUTH
To explore southern legal history it is first necessary to define the South.
of legal history, see L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
STUDY (1965); R. HUNT, LAW AND LocoMoTIvEs: THE IMPACT OF THE RAILROAD ON WISCON-
SIN LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1958); W. JOHNSON, supra note 41; and F. LAURENT,
THE BusIN OF A TRIAL COURT: 100 YEARS OF CASES (1959). Although not a study of Wiscon-
sin, H. SCHEIER, Omo CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY,
1820-1861 (1969) is part of the Hurstian tradition of state studies that focus on law and economic
development. Perhaps ifJ. Willard Hurst had taught in Chapel Hill, instead of Madison, we would
know a great deal about southern lumber, railroads, lawyers, and the like, and much less about
midwestern legal history.
50. This thesis also presupposes a "national" legal history with some local variations. If this
view is correct, future scholars might profitably investigate local and state developments, rather than
studying developments in large sections and regions. The study of the law of slavery might fit into
this thesis because slavery was local, important, and interesting, but (so the theory goes) did not
affect the development of legal history per se.
51. Zainaldin, supra note 37, at 1069.
52. Stanley N. Katz has observed that the "Hurst school" of legal history "has been both
Whiggish and present-minded" in its interests. According to Katz, this orientation explains these
scholars' lack of interest in the colonial period. Katz, supra note 5, at 466. The whiggishness of the
Hurst school also may explain its lack of interest in slavery, which it erroneously perceives as discon-
nected from the main flow of American history.
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The major theme of southern history-race and racial separation-provides the
basis for a working definition. Slavery before the Civil War and segregation
after the War set the boundaries of the South. Racial prejudice and discrimina-
tion have not been confined to the South,53 but only in the South were they
consistently and pervasively institutionalized through statutes, constitutions, lo-
cal ordinances, and customs that functioned as laws.5 4 As racial segregation
and discrimination decline in the South and equal opportunity for blacks in-
creases,55 scholars eventually may question whether the "South" continues to
53. The legal history of race relations in the North is limited. The leading survey on the ante-
bellum period, L. LrTwAcK. NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961), explores the popular prejudice against
blacks but is sometimes incorrect or misleading in its discussion of legal discrimination. Studies of
individual states or cities have dominated work on northern race relations. See, eg., R. COTrROL,
THE AFRo-YANKEEs: PROVIDENCE'S BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA (1982); D.
GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915 (1976); . HORTON & L. HORTON,
BLACK BOSTONIANS (1979); K. KUSMER, A GHETro TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-
1930 (1976).
The nation's first school desegregation case, which took place in Boston in 1849, was unsuccess-
ful. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849). This case, however, arose before the
Civil War and the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and was overturned by the state legisla-
ture, which passed a law prohibiting segregated education. Law of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 256, 1855
Mass. Acts 674. See L. LEvY & D. JONE s, Jim CRow IN BOSTON (1974). For a more modern
school desegregation case in the North, see Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.)
(drawing of school district lines to preserve segregated schools violates Constitution), aff'd, 294 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1961).
Most northern segregation developed out of social and economic conditions, including white
hostility toward blacks, rather than out of statutory prohibitions against integration. See eg., Bell v.
City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.) (holding that de facto segregation in Gary was a result of
housing discrimination rather than intentional actions by the school system), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1963). The courts have declared some types of de facto segregation unconstitutional, but
the remedies for such conditions are uncertain. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (re-
jecting cross district busing between Detroit and its suburbs to end de facto segregation, which the
court recognized was caused in part by acts of the City of Detroit and the State of Michigan).
54. The statutes mandating segregation in the South are too numerous to list. These laws went
far beyond the well-known segregation of schools, public facilities, and public conveyances. Some
were quite creative, such as an Oklahoma law segregating telephone booths for blacks, Law of Mar.
30, 1915, ch. 262, 1915 Okla. Seass. Laws 513; a Mississippi law making it criminal to advocate or
publish "matter urging or presenting for public acception or general information, arguments or sug-
gestions in favor of social equality or of intermarriage between whites and negroes," Law of Mar.
25, 1920, ch. 214, 1920 Miss. Laws 307; a Georgia law prohibiting blacks and whites from playing
billiards together, Law of Aug. 26, 1925, No. 407, § 3, 1925 Ga. Laws 286, 286-88; and a Louisiana
statute requiring separate entrances at circuses for blacks and whites, Law of July 9, 1914, No. 235,
§ 1, 1914 La. Acts 465, 465-66. Kentucky not only required separate schools, but also provided that
no textbook issued to a black would "ever be reissued or redistributed to a white school child" or
vice versa. Law of Mar. 16, 1928, ch. 48, § 11, 1928 Ky. Acts 183, 187-88. Similarly, Florida
required that school books for blacks be stored separately from those for whites. C.V. WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JnM CROW 102 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
By 1907 most southern state constitutions mandated segregation; the few that did not predated
1870. See ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. XIV, § 256; DEL. CONsT. of 1897, art. X, § 2; FLA. CONST. of
1885, art. XII, § 12; GA. CONST. of 1887, art. VIH, § 1; Ky. CONST. of 1890, § 187; MISS. CONST.
of 1890, art. 8, § 207; N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 2, art. XIV, § 8; OKLA. CONT. of 1907, art. I,
§ 5, art. XI, § 3, art. XXIII, § 11; S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XI, § 7; TEx. CONST. of 1876, art.
VII, § 7; VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IX, § 140. The importance of custom and popular attitudes
toward segregation was revealed in the struggles to register black voters in the South during and
after the 1960s. Even when laws did not prohibit blacks from voting, white hostility and black fear
often prevented registration.
55. On the enduring problems of race and law in the South, see the discussion of racial classifi-
cation in Louisiana in Diamond & Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOYOLA L. REv. 255 (1983).
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exist as a distinctive region.56
The colonial South consisted of the six colonies south of Pennsylvania. The
nineteenth century South included the fifteen states that maintained slavery until
the Civil War.5 7 The twentieth century South consists of the fifteen ex-slave
states plus Oklahoma and West Virginia because all seventeen mandated racial
segregation at the state-wide level.58
The South began to emerge as a distinct region in the early colonial pe-
riod.59 Some legal historians, however, have questioned whether the "South"
56. In a recent book on crime in the nineteenth century South, Edward Ayers alludes to a
possible disappearance of the South as a distinctive region. E. AYERs, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PuISsmtNr IN Tm 19TH CENTuRY AMERICAN SoUTH 276 (1984). The South may
have begun to disappear in the last generation, although even that is unclear. Perhaps the election of
Jimmy Carter in 1976, the emergence of black voters and office holders, and the creation of a two
party political system signal the end of the South as it has been defined in the past. If integration
finally is achieved, the South may cease to be a distinctive region.
57. The states were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
58. These definitions may seem obvious. Nevertheless, some scholars, including the contribu-
tors to the most recent book on southern legal history, AmrIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, would
not accept them. Kermit Hall's analysis of southern judges completely ignores the judiciaries of
Delaware, West Virginia, and Oklahoma. Hall, The "Route to Hell"Retraced: The Impact of Popu-
lar Election on the Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4,
at 229. The classic study of the politics of the South, V.0. KEY, SOuTHERN POLICs IN STATE
AND NATION (1949), limited the South to the 11 states that formed the Confederacy. Some scholars
would place Delaware outside the South. For example, Ely & Bodenhamer, Regionalism and the
Legal History of the South, in AM IVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 3, assert that "southern lcgis-
lators. . . never entered competition with other jurisdictions to lure corporate headquarters with
hospitable laws." Such a statement must be qualified if Delaware is considered a southern state.
The existence of slavery or the maintenance of racial segregation characterize states designated
as Southern. The nineteenth century South must include all slave states. Delaware certainly was
southern under this criterion. Slavery also existed in the Indian Territory which became Oldahoma.
West Virginia had slavery until it seceded from Virginia. (Congress required West Virginia to adopt
a gradual emancipation scheme as a condition of entering the Union. See W. VA. CONST. of 1861-
63, art. XI, § 7, reprinted in 7 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITrUIONS 4031-32
(1909)).
All states that practiced or mandated racial segregation at the state-wide level must be included
in the twentieth century South. Delaware, one of the defendants in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), clearly was southern by that definition. As Mark Tushnet cogently argues, Topeka,
Kansas was in the Brown litigation precisely because it was not in a southern state. Tushnet, Or-
ganizing Civil Rights Litigation: The NAACP's Experience, in AMBiVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4,
at 171. Similarly, Oklahoma, which maintained segregated facilities, must qualify as a southern
state. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Oklahoma also filed an
amicus brief in Brown on behalf of the defendants and in favor of segregation. R. KLUoER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 724 (1975). West Virginia also maintained segregated facilities until forced to integrate.
For earlier indications that West Virginia is a southern state, see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1890).
The F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS consider all of the above states except Missouri to be in
the South. Indicative of the cultural misplacement of Missouri is that state's homicide rate. In 1978
the average homicide per 100,000 in the West North Central region was 5.1. In Missouri the average
was 10.4. F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 42 (1979).
59. It is possible that the South as a distinctive region no longer exists. Certainly this may be
true in a political sense. There is no longer a "solid South." It also may be true that a segregated
South is on its last legs, but this is a question that cannot yet be answered. See supra note 55.
The fate of Lenell Geter also raises the question whether racial discrimination in the South has
truly ended. In 1983 Lenell Geter, a black engineer, was convicted of robbing a fast-food restaurant
in Greenville, Texas of $615. Geter was sentenced to life in prison for this offense. The jury in the
case was entirely white. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1983, at A14, col. 1. A number of witnesses placed
Geter fifty miles from the scene of the crime at the time of the robbery. Id., March 23, 1984, at A14,
col. 1. In November 1983 the NAACP raised questions about the fairness of the trial. Id., Nov. 6,
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existed before the nineteenth century. James W. Ely, Jr. and David
Bodenhamer, for example, concede that "[i]t is debatable whether there was a
distinct South before the sectional crisis that preceded the Civil War."6 Law-
rence Friedman also seems willing to exclude the colonial period from any study
of a southern legal history.61 Certainly the colonial South was not a politically
conscious region bent on southern nationalism, states' rights, and anti-Yankee
sentiment. That would have been impossible because southern nationalism
could not exist in royal colonies. The cultural and economic patterns of the
South, however, especially the development of a slave-based planter elite, are
rooted in the history of the colonial South. No one would dispute that there was
a distinctive South after the Revolution; that South must have had a colonial
past. No southern historian would begin a history of the region in the ante-
bellum period. The literature on the history of the colonial South is too rich,
and the differences between the colonial South and the North on such matters as
labor systems, the source of immigrants, land holding patterns, religious denom-
inations, and political developments are too great to ignore.62 Therefore, if there
is a distinct southern legal history, it must have begun its development in the
colonial period.
63
1983, § I, at 29, col. 1. After he had served more than a year in prison Geter was granted a new trial
despite the objections of the prosecutors. The judge in the case publicly warned the prosecutors that
he would not allow them to use the jury selection process to exclude blacks from the jury. Id., Feb.
19, 1984, § 1, at 33, col. 1. In March 1984, after serving more than 14 months in prison, Geter was
released and all charges against him were dropped. Geter felt that the first conviction was due
primarily to "'personal motivation' on the part of some of those who arrested and prosecuted him"
and, like the media commentators, felt that the ultimate reversal was due to public outrage over the
conviction. Id., March 27, 1984, at A17, col. 6; Id., March 23, 1984, at A14, col. 1.
60. Ely & Bodenhamer, supra note 58, at 3.
61. See Friedman, The Law Between the States: Some Thoughts on Southern Legal History, in
AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 30 (noting a "neglect of southern legal history" in the
colonial period).
62. See, eg., W. CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION 1660-1713 (1968); W. CRAVEN,
THE SOUTHERN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1607-1689 (1949); W. CRAVEN,
WHITE, RED, AND BLACK: THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIAN (1971); C. EATON, A HIS-
TORY OF THE OLD SOUTH 1-15 (3d ed. 1975) (beginning with a short chapter on the colonial South);
R. ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740-1790 (1982); E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAV-
ERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975); P. 'WOOD, BLACK MA-
JoRrrY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA (1974).
63. The emphasis on the North in published works on the legal history of the United States is
mirrored in works on the legal history of the American colonies. Most of the work published on
colonial legal history has been about northern colonies.
Only minimal research exists concerning southern legal history during the colonial period. The
best available collection of essays on colonial legal history, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY
AMERICAN LAW (D. Flaherty ed. 1969), contains only one essay on the South, and it is about
Delaware. Another collection contains seven essays on Massachusetts and New England, one on
New York, one on Maryland, and one on Virginia. LAW AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA
(G. Billias ed. 1965).
Scholars have explored law in colonial Massachusetts extensively. See, e.g., D. ALLEN, IN
ENGLISH WAYS: THE MOVEMENT OF SoCIETIES AND THE TRANSFERRAL OF ENGLISH LOCAL
LAW AND CUSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1981); G. HAS-
KINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960); D. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS (1979); W. NELSON, supra note 32; W. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CON-
FLICr RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825 (1981); PLYMOUTH
COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859 (D. Konig & W. Nelson eds. 1976-81) (16 volume work); Murrin, The
Legal Transforration: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL
AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (S. Katz & L Murrin 3d ed. 1983).
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IV. THE CONTouRs OF SouTHERN LEGAL HISTORY
Three major topics help define the nature of southern legal history: slavery
and race, violence and criminal law, and legal culture and institutions.64 An
exploration of these subjects illustrates how southern legal history is distinctive
from or similar to the legal history of the rest of the Nation. Such an explora-
tion must be tentative because much remains unknown about American legal
history in general and about southern legal history in particular.
A. Slavery, Race, and Law 6
5
The most distinctive aspect of southern legal history is the region's use of
Much is also known about legal history in colonial New York. See, ag., J. ALEXANDER, A BRiEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (S. KATZ 2d ed. 1972); L. BIEMER,
WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: THE TRANSITION FROM DUTCH TO ENGLISH
LAW, 1643-1727 (1983); COURTS AND LAW IN EARLY NEW YORK (L. Hershkowitz & M. Klein
eds. 1978); J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 7; D. GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW EN-
FORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776 (1976); H. JOHNSON, ESSAYS ON NEW
YORK COLONIAL LEGAL HISTORY (1981); H. JOHNSON, THE LAW MERCHANT AND NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1664-1730 (1963); THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON (J. Goebel & J. Smith eds. 1964-81) (five volume work).
Outside of Virginia, however, we know very little about law in the colonial South. See R.
BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
VIRGINIA (1979); W. BRYSON, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA LEGAL HISTORY BEFORE 1900
(1979); CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA ix-lxxii (P. Hoffer & W. Scott eds. 1984);
Konig, 'Dale's Laws' and the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal Justice in Virginia, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsr. 354 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Konig, Dale's Laws]; Preyer, Crime, the CriminalLaw
and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Virginia, 1 LAW & HisT. REv. 53 (1983). A. ROEBER, FArIHFUL
MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1660-
1810 (1981), is the best work on southern legal history for the colonial period. Roeber's bibliography
contains an exhaustive list of published primary materials on colonial legal history in Virginia, as
well as an important list of secondary materials.
64. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Other topics include real property, the intergencra-
tional transmission of property, law and economic development, and family law. These subjects are
mentioned in some of the articles in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4.
65. The subject of slave law has proved extremely compelling. In contrast to the paucity of
work in most areas of southern legal history, the volume of literature on slave law, especially in the
post-Revolutionary period, is enormous. Indeed, the law of slavery has become a minor growth
industry among academics. One law professor has tried to write "a sort of 'Restatement of the Law
of Slavery,'" M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 9, while another has sought to understand the moral
implications of judges' decisions in cases involving slaves. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). A.E. Keir Nash, a political scientist, has
written numerous articles on slave law. See Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in
the State Supreme Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REV. 64 (1970); Nash, A More Equitable Past?
Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C.L. REV. 197 (1970);
Nash, Negro Rights Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The
Extraordinary Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C.L. REv. 141 (1969); Nash, Reason of
Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7 (1979).
Legal scholars have written on manumission, see Howington, "Not in the Condition of Horse or an
Ox": Ford v. Ford, The Law of Testamentary Manumission, and the Tennessee Court's Recognition
of Slave Humanity, 34 TENN. HIsr. Q. 249 (1975); slave crime, see M. HINDUS, supra note 37;
Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J.S. HIST. 537 (1974);
Schwartz, Forging the Shackles: The Development of Virginia's Criminal Code for Slaves, in
AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 125; business aspects of slave law, see Morris, "Society is not
marked by punctuality in the payment of debts" The Chattel Mortgages of Slaves, in AMBIVALENT
LEGACY, supra note 4, at 147 [hereinafter cited as Morris, Chattel Mortgages]; Morris, 's If the
Injury was Effected by the Natural Elements of Air, or Fire'" or Slave Wrongs and the Liabilities of
Masters, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 569 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Morris, Slave Wrongs]; Stealy, The
Responsibilities and Liabilities of the Bailee of Slave Labor in Virginia, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 336
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the legal system to perpetuate racial separation and the subordination of non-
whites. Courts in the colonial period helped create slavery, and courts after the
Revolution helped preserve it. The legal system after the Civil War developed a
rigid code of segregation; courts in the late twentieth century-especially federal
courts-were instrumental in ending legally enforced racial segregation.
1. Slavery and the Law
Although slavery existed in every American colony before 1775,66 by 1804
all the northern states had taken steps to end slavery, either through constitu-
tional provisions or statutory schemes of gradual emancipation. 67 Prior to these
developments, however, slavery had become a southern institution.
Most scholars agree that the development of a distinctive law of slavery,
and later segregation, was uniquely a southern phenomenon. That many books
on American legal history ignore slavery underscores the difficulty of integrating
southern legal developments into "American" legal history.68 This neglect may
stem from two beliefs: slavery is unimportant to mainstream American legal
(1968); northern responses to fugitive slave laws, see T. MORRis, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL
LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974) [hereinafter cited as T. MoRius, FREE MEN
ALL]; Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Antislavery Use of a Proslavery
Decision, 25 CIvIL WAR HisT. 5 (1979); and the Somerset precedent, see P. FnqELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMiTY (1981) [hereinafter cited as P.
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION]; Finkelman, The Law of Slavery and Freedom in California,
1848-1860, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 437 (1981); Wiecek, Somerset" Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of
Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHm. L. REv. 86 (1974) (characterizing Somerset as a
landmark opinion in Anglo-Americanjurisprudence). Even historians not generally known as "legal
historians" have added significantly to the literature on slavery. See D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823 (1975); Genovese, Slavery in the LegalHistory of
the South and the Nation (Book Review), 59 TEx. L. REv. 969 (1981). Sitting judges and practicing
attorneys have also joined the fray. See A. HIGINBOTHAM, supra note 2; Fede, Toward a Solution
of the Slave Law Dilemma: A Critique of Tushnet's THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAvERY, 2 LAW &
Hxsr. REv. 301 (1984).
John P. Reid, of New York University Law School, one of the most prolific legal historians, has
reached the following conclusion concerning one aspect of slavery and law:
Now, for the first time, one can claim that a topic in American legal history has been
investigated and analyzed so sufficiently that our comprehensive knowledge of its issues
and data compares favorably with the work done in some of the more extensively
researched areas of political, social, and economic history. That topic is the pre-Civil War
slave rendition law, applicable to the return of sojourning, transit, and fugitive slaves from
free states to the states of their owners.
Reid, Lessons of Lumpkin, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571, 571 (1982). Reid's observations, however,
apply only to scholarship concerning questions of interstate relations, slavery, and law. Despite the
explosion in scholarly literature on the subject, many questions about slave law remain unanswered.
William M. Wiecek has correctly observed that "the law of slavery still awaits its Maitland."
Wiecek, Book Review, 1982 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 274 (reviewing M. TUSHNET, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981)). Fortunately, there are many scholars working
hard to provide the kind of research that might one day lead to a Maitland for this subject. Two
areas of slave law, however, have been particularly neglected and are not yet understood: the inter-
action between slave law and legal doctrine, and the theoretical underpinnings of the law of slavery.
66. See Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the Thirteen Mainland Colonies of
British America, 34 WM. & MARY L.Q. 258, 260 (1977).
67. See A. ZmvERSMrr, THE FrsT EMANCIPATION: THE ABoLIoN OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH (1967). For differences in how northern and southern courts dealt with slavery after eman-
cipation in the North, see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFET UNION, supra note 65.
68. See supra notes 9-48 and accompanying text.
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history because it ended abruptly in 186569 or slavery was such a "peculiar"
institution7° that it did not affect other areas of law.
Both beliefs are wrong. Although slavery ended in 1865, the statutes, court
decisions, and informal quasi-legal mechanisms for race control, as well as the
rationales for the law of slavery, continued to affect southern law. The slave
codes of the ante-bellum period were the basis of the black codes of 1865-66 and
later were resurrected as the segregation statutes of the period after 1877.71 The
legal heritage of slavery did not end with its demise,72 nor is it likely that slav-
ery's impact on the law was limited to legal relationships involving slaves.73
The use of the law to control race relations and to advance the interests of
whites at the expense of blacks emerged in the colonial period when Virginia and
Maryland began to develop legal rationales, mechanisms, and institutions to
support the slave system. It is not surprising that jurists and lawyers born and
reared in the southern slave culture of the nineteenth century manipulated the
law to protect that culture. More interesting is how men not raised in such a
culture were able to adapt, or ignore, English common law to create a system of
slavery.
Through punishments and other legal innovations, Virginia moved to a sys-
tem of chattel slavery. The Virginia courts' treatment of runaway indentured
servants illustrates how the colonial legal system facilitated the emergence of
slavery. The blacks who came to Virginia before 1640 usually were not slaves,
but were servants indentured for a limited time. Some of these servants eventu-
ally gained their freedom; others were reduced to slavery through the interven-
tion of the Virginia courts. Runaway servants-black or white-were punished
severely by the Virginia authorities. With no explicit legislative sanction, the
69. See J.W. HURsr, supra note 21. In a more recent work Hurst acknowledges that "jl]aw, of
course, actively maintained slavery before 1862" but asserts that after that time "other factors
outside the law" such as the "structure of markets and education and class customs" created "barri-
ers to justice that were not only law-made." J.W. HURsr, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, supra note
20, at 64-65. This perhaps leads to the conclusion that the law of slavery is unimportant to the
development of American legal history. It seems quite apparent, however, that the law of slavery
paved the way for the law of segregation and helped lay the groundwork for the very "barriers to
justice" that Hurst describes.
70. Ante-bellum southerners used the term "our peculiar institution" to describe slavery. The
term is now associated with one of the most important books on slavery, K. STAMPP, THE PECU-
LIAR INSTrrUTIoN: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1956).
71. On the continuity between ante-bellum slavery and post-bellum segregation, see Scott, Seg-
regation: A Fundamental Aspect of Southern Race Relations, 1800-1860, 4 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 421-
41(1984).
72. As late as the 1930s a black was prosecuted in Georgia under a statute that originally was
designed to prevent slave insurrections. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (overturning de-
fendant's conviction for attempting to overthrow the government of Georgia by organizing a racially
integrated march of unemployed workers). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see C. MARTIN,
THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHER.N JUSTICE (1976).
73. In 1860 southerners owned more than 4,000,000 slaves, worth over two billion dollars in
the aggregate. The price of slaves varied, but an estimate of $500 per slave is very conservative. The
average sale price of Tennessee slaves in 1860 was over $850. In 1857 prime hands sold for as much
as $1550 and common hands for $1100. Women slaves sold for about $200 less than men, ranging in
value from $900 to $1350. In Louisiana average slaves sold for over $1,200 and skilled slaves for up
to $3,000. K. STAMPP, supra note 70, at 414-17. It is very likely that the huge amount of wealth
represented by slaves in the South affected legal developments beyond the master-slave relationship.
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Virginia courts often punished blacks more harshly than whites. For example,
in 1640 a black named John Punch ran away with a group of whites. All the
runaways were whipped, and the whites had additional time added to their in-
dentures. Punch, however, was ordered to "serve his said master or his assigns
for the time of his natural Life here or elsewhere." 74 Judge A. Leon Higgin-
botham asserts that this sentence "exemplifies the court's intent to deliberately
exercise partiality in its dealings with blacks."17 5 Higginbotham argues that the
"court turned social biases, at will, into hard legal judgments. In the true sense
of the word, the colonial judges constituted an activist court, in order to perpetu-
ate disparate cruelty on blacks."
'76
The Virginia court may not have been so purposefully racist as Higgin-
botham asserts. Rather, Punch represents just one of a number of instances in
which Virginia gradually moved toward slavery on a case-by-case basis, with
little planning or forethought. The haphazard nature of the early cases involv-
ing blacks suggests that Virginia's adoption of slavery was, in Winthrop Jordan's
apt phrase, "an unthinking decision."' 77 The initial impetus for slavery was the
Virginia authorities' willingness to exploit anyone they could.78 Having neither
a European background nor a government to protect them, blacks were more
vulnerable to such exploitation than other Virginians. In addition, by the 1640s
the Spanish and Portugese had been enslaving Africans for nearly two centuries.
The English in Virginia accepted what others in the New World were already
doing. Virginia colonists, however, did not merely copy Spanish and Portugese
practices; they creatively used courts of law, wills (and thus equity jurisdiction),
and eventually legislation to enslave blacks and create a system of slavery.
Legal doctrine concerning the treatment of slaves may have developed in
the South in three different ways. First, slave law may have developed sepa-
rately from other aspects of law. Thus, a body of law for torts committed by or
74. MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (H.R. MclI-
waine ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MNNuEs]. This, and many other early cases involving slavery,
are excerpted in JuDiCiAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (H. Catter-
all ed. 1926).
75. A. IhGiNBoAM, supra note 2, at 28.
76. Id. Other cases from colonial Virginia that delineate the relationship between blacks and
whites are scattered throughout MINTES, supra note 74. Included in this work is a 1630 case in
which a white man was punished "for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and the shame of
Christianity by defiling his body in lying with a negro," id. at 479, a 1674 case which shows the
different treatment of black and white runaways, id. at 382, and a 1640 case in which a white was
punished for fathering a child by a black servant, id. at 477; see also Act CII of the March 1661-62
session of the Virginia Grand Assembly, reproduced in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE 116 (W. Hening 2d
ed. New York 1823) (Ist ed. Richmond 1810) (providing special punishment for English servants
who run away with blacks); Act I of the Sept. 1668 session of the Virginia Grand Assembly, repro-
duced in 2 STATUTEs AT LARGE 270 (W. Hening 2d ed. New York 1823) (1st ed. Richmond 1810)
(declaring that masters would not be held responsible for any slaves killed while being punished).
77. On the origin of slavery, see W. JORDAN, WHrrE OVER BLAcK (1968); E. MORGAN, supra
note 62; and Deglar, Slavery and the Genesis of American Race Prejudice, 2 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y &
Hir. 52 (1959); see also Cottrol & Diamond, Book Review, 56 Ttm. L. REv. 1107 (1982) (reviewing
A. IGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATrER OF COLOR (1978)). For an account of the transition from
freedom to racially based slavery, see T. BREEN & S. INNEs, "MYNE OWNE GROUND": RACE AND
FREEDOM ON VIGINI'S EASTERN SHORE, 1640-1676 (1980).
78. Cf. E. MORGAN, supra note 62, at 295-315 (describing the shift from a system of indentured
servitude to slavery in Virginia).
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against slaves may have developed apart from tort law for cases not involving
slaves. Second, nonslave law may have affected slave law. Under this theory,
tort law for slaves would not have differed from tort law for nonslaves. Last,
tort law for slaves might have affected other types of law. Thus, the adjudication
of tort cases between nonslaves might have differed in the South from the North
because southern judges applied principles of slave torts. Brief examples in spe-
cific areas of law illustrate the connections between the law of slavery and other
aspects of law.
The intergenerational transmission of slave property led to unusual rulings
by some courts. A testator's intent to free his slaves often raised tremendous
policy problems and resulted in peculiar interpretations of precedent. For exam-
ple, in 1799 in Pleasants v. Pleasants,79 Virginia's highest court strained to en-
force two Quaker testators' wishes to emancipate their slaves. The Pleasants
court asserted that slaves were "on the same footing with other chattels," 80 but
then proceeded to treat the Pleasants' slaves as a class rather than as individu-
als.81 More importantly, the court treated the case as though the slaves were
litigants rather than "chattels." To free the slaves the court ignored the specific
dictates of Virginia's 1782 manumission statute8 2 and refused to apply the rule
against perpetuities.83 It is obvious that the court freed the slaves because of the
judges' humanitarian instincts, even though existing law had to be ignored or
rejected.
In Elder v. Elder's Executor," an 1833 case, the same Virginia court stated
the well-known rule that "[iun the construction of wills, we are to find out the
meaning, the intention, the will, of the testator; and unless that violates some
principle of law, it must be carried into execution."8 5 The court in Elder ig-
nored the strict letter of the will in order to effectuate the testator's intent to free
his slaves. By 1858, however, the Virginia court was less solicitous of the inten-
tion of the testator. In Bailey v. Poindexter's Executor8 6 the court rejected
Elder's adherence to the testator's intent, because by that time, a majority of the
justices opposed manumission on political grounds. A year later Mississippi's
79. 6 Va. 329, 2 Call 319 (1800).
80. Id. at 334, 2 Call at 335.
81. Id. at 335, 2 Call at 339.
82. Id. at 336, 2 Call at 340-41. In 1771, shortly before he died, John Pleasants wrote a will
requesting that his slaves, and any children of his slaves, be emancipated "if they chuse it when they
arrive at the age of thirty years, and the laws of the land will admit them to be set free without their
being transported out of the country." Id. at 329, 2 Call at 319. In absence of a law allowingmanumission the slaves were divided among various family members. In 1782 a Virginia statute
allowed the manumission of slaves within the state. Act XXI of the 1619 session of the Virginia
General Assembly, reproduced in 11 STATUTES AT LARGE 39 (W. Hening ed. Richmond 1823).
This law required that no old or infirm slave could be manumitted unless the master provided funds
to prevent the slave from becoming a charge of the community. The court ignored this provision of
the will because "the testator cannot reasonably be supposed to have contemplated an act of emanci-
pation, making no provision to prevent the persons liberated from being chargeable to the public."
Pleasants, 6 Va. at 336, 2 Call at 341.
83. Pleasants, 6 Va. at 338-41, 2 Call at 347-57.
84. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 930 (1833).
85. Id. at 931.
86. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 428 (1858).
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highest court also refused to enforce the intent of a testator with respect to his
slaves on purely political grounds.
8 7
These decisions suggest how slavery created special problems for judges.
They also indicate how the "law of slavery" may have affected other aspects of
law. If the rule against perpetuities could be ignored to free slaves, as it was in
Pleasants, perhaps it also could be ignored in other cases. Similarly, if the intent
of the testator could be frustrated as it was in Bailey, it might also be disregarded
in cases that did not involve slaves. The decisions involving slavery and wills
made the law of property transmission uncertain. Although more research is
needed to determine how this uncertainty affected other areas of the law, the
case law involving slavery and wills does evidence the tensions slavery created
for the legal system.
Slavery also affected the law of industrial accidents. The "fellow servant
rule" articulated by Chief Justice Shaw in Massachusetts"8 theoretically could
not have been applied to slaves. Shaw's decision, which was followed by most
American jurisdictions, held that a worker injured on the job by the negligence
of another worker (a fellow servant) could not sue his employer; instead, the
injured worker could sue only the negligent fellow servant. Given the wages of
most nineteenth century workers, the fellow servant was likely to be judgment
proof.8 9 Shaw asserted that workers gained extra compensation for dangerous
work through their contracts and that workers were in the best position to know
if their fellow servants were likely to be negligent. If a worker knew that fellow
servants were negligent, the worker could, according to Shaw, leave the danger-
87. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859) (former slave voluntarily taken to Ohio and freed by
her owner could not inherit property in Mississippi). Mitchell rejected earlier precedents established
in Hinds v. Brazealle, 2 Miss. 88, 2 Howard 837 (1838), and Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246 (1858).
88. Farwel v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 44 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). As Lawrence Friedman
points out, the Farwell case was not the first American use of the "fellow servant rule" but only the
"leading case." Friedman, supra note 61, at 31. The first American case was Murray v. South
Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. 166, 1 McMul. 385 (1841). Significantly, Murray was one of two American
cases (the other was from Massachusetts) that Shaw cited in his opinion. This suggests the possibil-
ity of a development in American law that was not sectional. In fact, the "fellow servant rule"
appears to have been applied by virtually all American courts to accidents involving free men. L.
LEvY, supra note 29, at 171. It does not appear, however, that the rule was universally applied to
slaves or even to blacks. M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 183-88.
89. Shaw's opinion implied that workers who sought higher wages would take riskier jobs at
higher pay. Shaw noted that plaintiff Farwell was paid two dollars a day, "that being the usual
wages paid to engine-men, which are higher than the wages paid to a machinist, in which capacity
the plaintiff formerly was employed." Farwel v. Boston & Worchester R.R., 44 Mass. (4 Met.) 49,
50 (1842). But, as Charles Warren pointed out many years ago, "students of political economy know
that as a matter of fact wages of a particular workman are not regulated in this way." Warren,
Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1895). More likely,
Farwell's higher wages were due to his greater level of skill. An engineer on a train was probably in
no greater danger than anyone else on the train. Even if Farwell's negligent fellow servant had
earned as much as Farwell, he probably would have had insufficient resources to satisfy Farwell's
claim. The logic behind the fellow servant rule was that workers who are less averse to risks will
seek dangerous jobs with higher salaries. But as Stanford Law School's Robert Rabin has pointed
out, "the history of workmen's compensation reform is singularly free of any reference to laborers
protesting against the legislation on the grounds that a compulsory safety premium was likely to
have a depressing effect on wages." Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle7 A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. Rv. 925, 940 (1981).
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ous job site, report the negligent workers to someone in charge, or reprimand the
workers himself.
Shaw's rationale for the fellow servant rule could not apply to slaves.
Slaves were not free to negotiate contracts, leave unsafe job sites, or instruct
fellow workers on job safety. The fellow servant rule, therefore, clearly was in-
applicable to the thousands of slaves owned by or hired out to southern manu-
facturing, mining, and transportation industries.90 As a Louisiana court noted,
the fellow servant rule could not apply to slaves because a slave "cannot decline
any service, still less leave the service." 91 The Kentucky Court of Appeals had
previously expressed a similar sentiment. In refusing to apply the fellow servant
rule to a slave the court noted: "A slave may not, with impunity, remind and
urge a free white person, who is a co-employee, to a discharge of his duties, or
reprimand him for his carelessness or neglect."'92 South Carolina, the first
American jurisdiction to adopt the fellow servant rule,93 refused to apply the
doctrine to slaves.
94
The use of slaves in industrial situations also complicated the application of
the fellow servant rule to whites. Slaves could not be deemed the "fellow ser-
vants" of anyone. Thus, if a slave's negligence injured a free worker, that
worker could sue the owner or bailee of the slave for damages.9 - Indeed, with
the exception of the North Carolina Supreme Court,96 no southern court was
willing to treat a slave as a fellow servant.
9 7
Slavery also affected other aspects of tort law. One troublesome question
for southern jurists was the allocation of liability for torts committed by slaves.
In Snee v. Trice9" the South Carolina court refused to hold a master liable for
90. See R. LEwis, COAL, IRON, AND SLAvEs: INDusTriAL SLAVERY IN MARYLAND AND
VmGINIA, 1715-1865 (1979); R. STAROBIN, INDUSTRiAL SLAVERY IN THE OLD SOUTH (1970);
Dew, Disciplining Slave Ironworkers in the Ante-Bellum South, 79 AM. Hisr. REV. 393 (1974);
Miller, The Fabric of Controk Slavery in Antebellum Southern Textile Mills, 55 Bus. HISr. REV.
471 (1981).
91. Howes v. Steamer Red Chief, 15 La. Ann. 321, 324 (1860).
92. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yandell, 56 Ky. 466, 473, 17 B. Mon. 586, 596 (1856).
93. Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. 166, 1 MaMul. 385 (1841).
94. White v. Smith, 46 S.C.L. 201, 12 Rich. 595 (1860). In White the court held that an em-
ployer would be relieved of liability for the injury or death of hired slaves only if the slaves had been
negligent and essentially had harmed themselves. The fellow servant cases suggest that the southern
state courts cited each other more frequently than the northern state courts cited southern courts.
This is another area in which research might help determine whether legal doctrine differed between
the North and the South.
95. See eg., Cook & Scott v. Parham, 24 Ala. 21 (1853); Forsyth v. Perry, 5 Fla. 337 (1853);
Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195 (1846); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yandell, 56 Ky. 466, 17 B.
Mon. 585 (1856); Kelly v. White, 56 Ky. 98, 17 B. Mon. 124 (1856); Howes v. Steamer Red Chief,
15 La. Ann. 321 (1860); Harvey v. Skipwith, 57 Va. 154, 16 Gratt. 393 (1863); Randolph v. Hill, 34
Va. 669, 7 Leigh 383 (1836).
96. See Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245 (1858); Heathcock v.
Pennington, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 640 (1850).
97. But see M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 183. Mark Tushnet finds "confusion" in the "cases
adopting and applying the fellow-servant rule in the South." Id. He notes "explicit disagreement
among the courts over the question of a hirer's liability to an owner for injuries to the hired slave
caused by the hirers other employees." Id. Tushnet believes this "disagreement rested precisely on
the varying degrees to which the courts were willing to go in treating the owner-hirer-slave relation-
ship as a purely market relationship." Id.
98. 2 S.C.L. 137, 2 Bay 345, modified, 3 S.C.L. 84, 1 Brev. 178 (1802).
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damages caused by a fire started by his slaves for a benign purpose. 99 The court
rejected "the rigid doctrine ... in England" that masters were strictly liable for
the torts of their servants.1° The court in Snee held masters responsible for
slave torts only when the slave was acting "in pursuance of his master's
directions."10 1
Morton Horwitz asserts that Snee is "[tihe earliest reported American
master-servant case in which failure to prove carelessness in the servant becomes
the basis for denying the master's liability."'1 2 Horwitz correctly notes that the
result in this case reflects "a strong incentive to limit the scope of liability for the
acts of slaves." 10 3 Horwitz finds "no indication that the South Carolina decision
had any influence on the course of American law. Outside South Carolina, the
decision was ignored, probably having been regarded as limited to the peculiar
problem of slavery."' 1 4 This is not entirely correct; courts in at least three other
states cited Snee for the proposition that masters were not liable for damages
caused by their slaves.' 0 5 Snee and similar cases in other states suggest the de-
velopment of a distinctively southern law.
Thomas D. Morris interprets Snee in a different way.10 6 Morris argues that
Snee merely applied the English rule that the law "would not impose a liability
upon a master beyond that defined by the analogous rules of English master-
servant law."'1 7 In England a master was responsible only for torts committed
by his servant while acting under the master's direction. Morris argues that this
was the same concept of limited liability of the master adopted by the South
Carolina court. Morris' argument is no less persuasive than EHorwitz'.' 08 If
99. In Snee Trice's slaves started a fire in the morning, when there was no wind. The fire was
either for clearing brush or cooking their meals. Later in the day a sudden wind revived the smol-
dering coals and the ensuing fire destroyed Snee's corn crib and corn crop. Id. at 137, 2 Bay at 345.
100. Snee, 2 S.C.L. at 139, 2 Bay at 349. It is not at all clear that this understanding of English
law was correct. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 139, 2 Bay at 350.
102. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 16, at 92.
103. Id. at 93.
104. Id.
105. McConnell v. Hardemen, 15 Ark. 151, 153-54 (1854); Ewing v. Thompson, 13 Mo. 132,
136 (1850); Wright v. Weatherly, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 367 (1836). It is possible that Snee was cited in
other states as well. One problem for legal historians is that ante-bellum cases cannot be shepardized
between states. Thus, the only way to determine if a case has been cited by other courts is to read
the decisions of the other courts.
That Horwitz found no use of Snee by other courts underscores the neglect of the South by
most legal historians. The number of citations a case has received is only one measure of its accept-
ance by other jurisdictions. For example, a number of southern courts cited Wingis v. Smith, 14
S.C.L. 162, 3 McCord 400 (1825), a case that reaffirmed the doctrine of Snee. Because of the diffi-
culty of obtaining reports from other states in the early nineteenth century, it is likely that courts
cited Vingis more frequently than Snee because reports of Wingis were more available than those of
Snee.
106. Morris, Slave Wrongs, supra note 65.
107. Id. at 580.
108. The differences between Morris and Horwitz reflect utter confusion about the emergence of
negligence as a doctrine in Anglo-American law. This confusion stems from a lack of consensus
about the state of law in England as well as "It]he meager quality of the English and American
evidence.. .[concerning] pre-nineteenth century tort doctrine." Schwartz, Tort Law and the Econ-
omy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.. 1717, 1722 (1981). One
reason for the paucity of relevant evidence, as Stanley Katz notes, is the "emphasis on medieval
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Morris' reading of Snee is correct, however, the South Carolina court accepted
an English doctrine at the expense of the traditional slave state view that slaves
were theoretically always under the control of the master.
Whether one accepts Horwitz' reading of Snee as a creative new American
doctrine, or Morris' view of Snee as an adaptation of existing English doctrine,
one aspect of the case was innovative. Snee clearly rejected the venerable com-
mon-law doctrine that those who caused damage by fire were strictly liable. In
Snee plaintiff could not recover for the loss of his corn crib because defendant
was not held responsible for the fire damage caused by his slaves. Had the fire
been started by free servants instead of slaves, it is possible that the master of the
servants still would not have been liable. Nevertheless, a plaintiff injured by the
negligence of free servants would have been able to sue such servants. Snee, in
contrast, certainly could not sue the negligent slaves directly. Thus, the effect of
Snee was to create a major exception to the law of fires; if for legitimate purposes
slaves started a fire that accidently burned someone's property, neither master
nor servant would be liable.
In 1838 the South Carolina court extended the holding in Snee to free ser-
vants. 109 Thus, a decision concerning slaves set a precedent for cases involving
whites. 10 By 1860 most southern jurisdictions had adopted Snee's holding that
masters could not be held responsible, either at civil or criminal law, for the
unauthorized acts of their slaves."' The complicated nature of slave negligence
cases demonstrates the importance of studying how doctrinal developments of
southern states were affected by slavery.1 12
studies" by most English legal historians; "[flor Maitland and his followers, the 'modem' era began
with Henry VII and history ended with the English Civil War." Katz, supra note 5, at 458. This
problem is also discussed in L. FRiEDMAN, supra note 37, at 409-27 (considering the impact of the
industrial revolution on the modem law of torts); M. HoRwrrz, supra note 16, at 67-108 (tracing the
development of tort law and its impact on economics); G.E. WHrTE, JUDIcIAL TRADITION, supra
note 22, at 43-45 (discussing the absence of published court decisions and established law in nine-
teenth century America); Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in the Fourteenth Cen-
tury Law of Torts, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 361 (1979) (suggesting that civil liability in trespass actions
was strict in the medieval period); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(addressing the development and function of negligence in tort); and Rabin, supra note 89 (sug-
gesting that the scarcity of recorded decisions makes it difficult to determine whether tort liability
required a finding of fault in the preindustrial era).
109. O'Connell v. Strong, 10 S.C.L. (Dud.) 265 (1838).
110. The court in O'Connell relied on the principles announced in Snee and Wingis, drawing a
direct analogy between slaves and hired workers. Id. at 266. This analogy suggests the need for
work on the connections between slave law, legal theory, and proslavery thought. See infra notes
113-16 and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., Cawthom v. Deas, 2 Port. 276 (Ala. 1835); McConnell v. Hardeman, 15 Ark. 151
(1854); Ewing v. Thompson, 13 Mo. 132, 136 (1850). In Garrett v. Freeman, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 78
(1857), the North Carolina Supreme Court held a master liable for fire damage caused by his negli-
gent slaves acting under the authority of their master. If the slaves had acted on their own, the
master perhaps would not have been liable.
112. See Morris, Chattel Mortgages, supra note 65. Morris suggests that the law of mortgages in
the South was affected by slave mortgages.
The law of warranties also probably was affected by slavery. One of the few places in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMEmcAN LAW in which Professor Horwitz makes extensive use of south-
em decisions and legislation is his discussion of warranties of title. M. HORwrrz, supra note 16, at
58-62. Horwitz' discussion concerns real property, but the peculiar nature of slave property may
have affected how southern courts and legislatures looked at all property. Certainly a warranty of
soundness raised greater problems when the object of sale was a person, rather than a fungible
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The theoretical basis of slave law remains unclear. Some years ago Daniel
J. Boorstin pointed out "how few books on the laws of slavery came out of the
South."' 1 3 The reasons southerners failed to produce both practical and theo-
retical books on the law of slavery deserve further exploration. 114 The only ma-
jor southern work on slave law for practitioners, Thomas R.R. Cobb's An
Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery," 5 was not published until 1858. Some
major proslavery theorists, including Henry Hughes and George Jitzhugh, used
legal theory, legal history, and legal reasoning in their defense of slavery.
116
Scholars need to begin the important and difficult task of writing an intellectual
history of slave law that will combine the works of theorists with case law. The
nature of a separate southern jurisprudence can be understood only when schol-
ars have examined its theoretical foundations.
2. Segregation Law
In the aftermath of slavery, racial segregation became a hallmark of the
South. In the development of segregation law the major problems confronting
lawmakers were less difficult theoretically than the problems of slave law. The
dual status of slaves as both persons and things had complicated slave law, but
this was no longer a problem after blacks gained legal status as persons and
theoretical equality with whites. 117 The demise of slavery, however, presented
southern lawmakers with a difficult practical problem: how to maintain racial
separation while exploiting black labor for the benefit of white planters and capi-
product of the farm or industry. M. TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 158-69, offers important insights
into the fungibility of slaves as commodities. The problem of the warranty of soundness is explored
in S. Fede, Consumer Protection and the Law of Slave Sales in the 19th Century U.S. South: A
Caveat Concerning Caveat Emptor (unpublished paper on fie with the North Carolina Law Review).
113. D. Boohsrm, Tim AMERICANs: Tim NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 204 (1965).
114. Several important works on slave law were published in the North. See W. GOODELL,
AMERICAN SLAVE CODE (New York 1853); J. HuRD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES (lst vol. Boston 1858) (2d vol. Boston 1862); G. STRouD, A SKETCH OF THE
LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(rev. ed. Philadelphia 1856) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1827); J. WHEELER, A PRACrICAL TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF SLAVERY, BEING A COMPILATION OF ALL THE DECISIONS MADE ON THAT SUBJECT,
IN THE SEVERAL CoURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (New York 1837).
115. T.R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY N THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SLAVERY (Philadelphia & Sa-
vannah 1858). No careful analysis of this book has been written. Unfortunately, the recent biogra-
phy of Cobb devotes little space to this book. See W. MCCASH, supra note 35.
116. See G. FrrZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! (rev. ed. 1960) (1st ed. Richmond 1857); G. Frrz-
HUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH: OR THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY (Richmond 1854); H.
HuGHES, TREATISE ON SOCIOLOGY, THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL (Philadelphia 1854).
117. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIM-XV. In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the United States Supreme Court stated that blacks techni-
cally were equal to whites and refused to examine the question of equality further. Justice Bradley's
language in the Civil Rights Cases is particularly striking for its insensitivity to the plight of the
recently freed blacks:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of
his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary
modes by which other men's rights are protected.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. It was, of course, precisely at this time that blacks were
becoming the special target of the law.
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talists. The imagination of southern lawmakers in devising new ways to segre-
gate blacks deserves the attention of all Americans concerned about law, human
dignity, and justice.
Legal historians have barely explored the ways in which courts and legisla-
tures imposed a quasi-slavery on freedmen in the years after Reconstruction. 11 8
Perhaps this is because there seem to be few doctrinal changes to study in this
period. The "Jim Crow" legislation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries appears more significant as a political or social phenomenon then as a
legal development. Judicial decisions and doctrine seem to have played a lesser
role in the development of racial segregation. In the wake of the Civil War
"[t]he responsibility for defining the legal status of blacks fell to the legisla-
ture.1119 This trend contrasts with the development of slavery in the seven-
teenth century and with the emergence of slave law between 1790 and 1861;
judges created the legal doctrine that supported slavery.
120
Insufficient research exists in southern legal history for this period to know
how judges and doctrine affected segregation. It is significant, for example, that
the section about race in Ambivalent Legacy, the most important recent addition
to the literature on southern legal history, jumps from an essay on slave law to
one on the Brown decision. 12 1 Similarly, although the recent Vanderbilt sympo-
sium on southern legal history focused primarily on the nineteenth century, it
devoted only a handful of pages to race and law during Reconstruction and in
the "New South."'122 A legal history of race relations between the Civil War
and the civil rights movement should be written to teach lawyers about the con-
tinuity of law from the era of the "Great Civil War" 123 to the era of the Great
Society. One place to begin is with a study of state constitutions after Recon-
struction and the development of a segregationist constitutional theory.124
Although legal historians have shown little interest in questions of race in
118. See generally H. HYMAN & W. WIBCEK, supra note 27 (comprehensive survey of legal and
constitutional history from 1835-1875; chapter on the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments partic-
ularly useful in understanding Reconstruction); L. LrrwACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG (1979)
(Pulitzer Prize winning history of freedmen immediately after the Civil War, detailing the difficult
transition from slavery to freedom, and the lack of protection former slaves received from the federal
government.); H. RABNowrrz, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890 (1978) (his-
tory of the development of urban segregation in the South, showing that segregation began with the
end of the Civil War); C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54 (arguing that segregation developed in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, rather than immediately after the Civil War or after
Reconstruction).
119. Haws & Namorato, Race, Property Rights, and the Economic Consequences of Reconstruc-
tion" A Case Study, 32 VAND. L. REv. 305, 312 (1979) (discussing Mississippi legislation).
120. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
121. Morris, Chattel Mortgages, supra note 65, at 147; Schwartz, supra note 65, at 125; Tushnet,
supra note 58, at 171.
122. Supra note 4. The symposium contained 412 pages. 32 VAND. L. REV. 1-412 (1979).
Nineteen pages were devoted to race and law during Reconstruction. See Haws & Namorato, supra
note 119, at 305-26.
123. Address by President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (November 19, 1863).
124. See supra note 54. One example of this kind of work is M. MCMILLAN, CONSTrrTUONAL




the post-Civil War South, 125 they have focused considerable attention on the
struggle to end segregation in the twentieth century. 126 Such work helps make
the connection between legal history and constitutional history; developments
and activities at the local level, such as sit-ins, marches, and litigation to inte-
grate schools, are thus linked to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Equally important is the connection between constitutional doctrine and
the behavior of local courts, legislatures, and other public institutions. The
study of the connection between local events and the nation's highest court also
might lead to an understanding of a special southern constitutional history. The
South, more than any other region of the nation, traditionally has been uncom-
fortable with the centralized federalist system that emerged from the Constitu-
tion and the Marshall court. Although concepts such as states' rights and state
sovereignty have been used by northern politicians and activists, 127 these con-
cepts generally are associated with the South. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries these doctrines sometimes were evoked for reasons that had little to do
with slavery. 128 Slavery and racial segregation, however, were the chief motiva-
tions for the doctrines of states' rights and state sovereignty, especially during
the period after the Civil War, when state nullification was forever buried by the
results of the War.
Tony Freyer's recent study of integration in Little Rock illustrates the na-
ture of southern constitutional thought, its connection to race relations, and how
it ultimately was discredited. Freyer's book explores the tensions between local
blacks, white-dominated school boards, fire-eating politicians, and the federal
125. One exception is Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 42 J.S. HisT. (1976).
126. See ag., T. FREYER, THE LITTLE RoCK CRISIS: A CoNsrrruTIoNAL INTERPRETATION
(1984); Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-
1958, 68 GaO. L.J. 1 (1979). The best study of desegregation remains R. KLJGER, supra note 58.
127. Most significantly, northern opponents of slavery made use of states' rights theories in the
late ante-bellum period. Under theories of states' rights northern courts freed slaves owned by visit-
ing masters. See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); P. FINaLmAN, AN LMPERFECT UNION,
supra note 65. More serious challenges to federal authority came from opponents of the 1850 Fugi-
tive Slave Law, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (entitled "An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons
escaping from the Service of their masters"). The Wisconsin Supreme Court vigorously challenged
the federal government's power with respect to fugitive slaves in Exparte Booth, 3 Wis. 145 (1854),
and in In re Booth, 3 Wis. 157 (1854). These cases led to the Supreme Court's strong defense of
federal power in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). In Ableman Chief Justice Taney
asserted that the concept of states' rights was "new in the jurisprudence of the United States as well
as of the States." Id. at 514. Taney asserted that under the Constitution
many of the rights of sovereignty which the States... possessed should be ceded to the
General Government; and that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, [the federal govern-
ment] should be supreme, and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals,
without interruption from a State or from State authorities.
Id. at 517. Taney reminded Wisconsin that "every State has plighted to the other States to support
the Constitution as it is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the
Constitution itself prescribes." Id. at 525. It is perhaps not surprising, although somewhat ironic,
that in the Little Rock decision the Supreme Court quoted Taney's proslavery decision with ap-
proval. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). For other antislavery uses of states' rights doctrine,
see T. MoRRis, FREE MEN ALL, supra note 65. On the various uses of states' rights in American
history, see A. SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEwPon'rs IN AmERicAN HisroRY 220-44 (1922).
128. The best-organized and most vociferous opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1
Stat. 596, came from the South and led to the Virginia Resolution, authored by James Madison, and
the Kentucky Resolution, secretly authored by then Vice President Thomas Jefferson.
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government. 129 Freyer acknowledges the contradictory elements of the South-
localism, agrarianism, populism, and evangelical protestantism-and discusses
the South's ambivalent relationship with the federal government after the New
Deal brought electricity, highways, and educational aid to the South. He also
demonstrates how some of the contradictory elements of the South conflicted
during the Little Rock crisis.
130
Perhaps the most important lesson of Little Rock and the other desegrega-
tion struggles is that the push for integration in the South came from
southerners. The school cases were initiated by southern black parents who
took incredible risks to improve the educational opportunities of their chil-
dren. 13 1 Southern state law enforcement officers were rarely interested in pro-
tecting the rights of the southern blacks who demanded equality. It was left to
federal district and circuit court judges, often native southerners themselves, to
provide the means for black southerners to overcome their legal disabilities.
Thus, a key aspect of twentieth century southern legal history is the federal
courts' counterbalance to the racial discrimination of the majority. Decisions of
federal judges at the local level were critical to ending segregation.' 32 The Little
Rock case of Aaron v. Cooper,' 33 initially a dispute at the local level over how to
implement desegregation, grew into a constitutional and political crisis of na-
tional importance.' 34 Thus, a study of local tensions and issues must be tied to
the examination of larger constitutional and political issues.
The Little Rock crisis illustrates one other aspect of twentieth century
southern legal history: the philosophy of localism, so much a part of the South,
was easily jettisoned when it did not fit the prevailing orthodoxy. Governor
Faubus' interference with the Little Rock school board "was contrary even to
states' rights doctrines" because in a crucial election two integrationists had won
"nearly two-to-one victories over segregationist candidates .. .. ,,13 Ideologi-
cal consistency was easily sacrificed for racial solidarity in the South during this
period. White supremacy, rather than states' rights or local control, thwarted
the civil rights struggle. An understanding of this phenomenon may turn consti-
tutional theory on its head, at least with regard to race relations. Terms such as
129. T. FREYER, supra note 126, at 10-13.
130. Id.
131. The best discussion of personal sacrifice for school integration is in R. KLUGER, supra note
58, at 1-26.
132. Cf. J. BASS, UNLiKELY HEROES (1981) (history of judges of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit who implemented Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
133. 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aft'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957), same case on
remand, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); see also Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958)
(district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Gover-
nor of Arkansas and other state officials from preventing black children from attending a city high
school); Brewer v. Hoxie, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956) (complaint by the directors and superinten-
dent of a school district against persons who conspired to disrupt the implementation of desegrega-
tion was sufficient to state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
134. See Hutchinson, supra note 126, for a discussion of the critical importance of Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Cooper enabled the United States Supreme Court to reaffirm its commit-
ment to desegregation through an opinion signed by the entire Court.
135. T. FaYER, supra note 126, at 116.
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"strict construction," an "activist court," or "judicial restraint" cease to have
meaning when used by opponents of equality who were never committed to ab-
stract principles, but only to preserving segregation at any cost.
Questions involving race and law remain integral to an understanding of
southern legal history in areas other than race relations. The laws necessary to
protect slavery and ensure racial stratification after the Civil War also retarded
the industrialization of the South. Obviously, racial issues did not lead to stat-
utes limiting corporate investment or regulating industries. Nevertheless, south-
em law and custom concerning race affected the southern economy. If most of
the South was inhospitable to corporations, as two leading southern legal histori-
ans assert, 136 this may not have mattered, because the South could not attract
many corporations as long as it remained segregated. Statutes such as South
Carolina's prohibition on integrated work areas in textile mills137 may have im-
peded industrialization as much as laws regulating corporations. Similarly, the
South's focus on segregated schools rather than quality education undoubtedly
retarded southern development. Most districts in the South could not bear the
cost of a dual school system and provide quality education for either race.
138
The dual educational system also affected economic growth in the South because
the region's most valuable resource-its human capital-was so poorly
educated.
Race affected the whole experience of Reconstruction, the New South, and
the modem period. The impact of race on southern politics and law making led
to catastrophic results in the fifty years after the Civil War. Race had an espe-
cially important effect on criminal law in the post-bellum period. Between 1898
and 1908 approximately twelve hundred blacks were lynched. 139 Most of these
lynchings occurred in the South.' 4° The lynchings capped an era of brutality in
which the southern legal system simply ignored murders-usually of blacks, but
sometimes of whites. Thus, race affected the South's enforcement of its criminal
laws and maintenance of its prisons, as well as numerous other aspects of south-
em life and law.
B. Violence and Crime in the South
Several proponents of southern legal history believe that the South's legal
past is defined in part by "the prevalence and acceptance of violence as a means
of conflict resolution."'1'1 The great southern historian John Hope Franklin
noted: "Far from loathing violence, the man of the South was the product of his
136. Ely & Bodenhamer, supra note 58, at 8.
137. See C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54, at 98.
138. North Carolina went beyond separate schools to require that books used by white children
be kept separate from those used by blacks. Florida required separation even while the books were
in storage. Id. at 102. Such added costs led to inferior public education in the South for blacks and
whites.
139. J.H. FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALrrY IN AMERICA 68 (1976).
140. See NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918 (1919)
(containing a list of reported lynchings between 1889 and 1918).
141. Ely & Calvani, Forward to Symposium on the Legal History of the South, 32 VAND. L. REV.
3 (1979); see also CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL ViRGINIA, supra note 63, (record of crimi-
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experiences as a frontiersman, Indian fighter, slaveholder, self-sufficient yeoman,
poor white, and Negro. He gladly fought, even if only to preserve his reputation
as a fighter."' 142 For the nineteenth century, "[v]iolence permeates the most po-
tent and indelible images of the American South: eye-gouging free-for-alls at the
rural courthouse; men of aristocratic mien and pretension solemnly dueling at
ten paces; rebellious slaves writhing under the lash; chain gangs, bloodhounds,
and grisly lynchings."' 143 The notion of a violent South continues in the twenti-
eth century.
Statistics confirm the image of a violent South. Southern cities have the
highest per capita murder rates in the nation. 44 More than a decade ago the
New York Times noted that "[flor years Houston, New Orleans, and Dallas have
been handing back and forth the title 'Murder Capital of the United States.' "145
More recently Houston and Miami have vied for this dubious distinction, with
New Orleans running third.146 These cities are not isolated examples. In 1983
the fifteen southern cities with over one million persons ranked in the top
twenty-two cities for per capita homicides. Of the twenty-nine northern and
western cities with over a million persons only seven ranked in the top twenty-
two1 47 Smaller southern cities provide even grimmer statistics. In 1983, of fif-
teen cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 with the highest homicide rates,
twelve were in the South. The small towns of the South may be most dangerous
of all. Of the fifteen cities under 500,000 with the highest homicide rates, four-
teen were in the South.'
48
The nonurban South is equally violent. As early as the 1870s H.V. Redfield
estimated that the murder rate in South Carolina was ten times greater than that
of Massachusetts and that the rate in Texas was ten times that of Minnesota. 1
49
More precise figures in the twentieth century narrow these gaps but lead to simi-
lar results. Between 1920 and 1925 seven southern states led the list for homi-
cide rates among whites.' 50 In 1960 twelve southern states were in the top
fifteen for homicide rates. 151 In 1977 and 1978 the South led the nation in per
capita homicides and in per capita increases in homicides; although only thirty-
five percent of the Nation's population lived in the South at that time, the South
nal proceedings in colonial Virginia); E. AYERs, supra note 56 (describing 19th century southern
violence).
142. J.H. FRANKLIN, THE MIIrrANT SotrrH, 1850-1861, at 13 (1956).
143. E. AYEs, supra note 56, at 3.
144. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
145. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1971, at 71, col. 1, quoted in R. GASTIL, CULTURAL REGIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 200 (1975).
146. F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST[cE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 58-84 (1978); id. at 60-86
(1980); id. at 349-76 (1982); id. at 353-382 (1983). The only competition for third place has been
from Los Angeles.
147. F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 353-82 (1983).
148. Id.
149. H.V. REDFIELD, HOMICIDE, NORTH AND SouT (1880). Redfield's work is discussed in
R. GAsT, supra note 145, at 104-05.
150. R. GAsTi, supra note 145, at 106.
151. Id. at 107.
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accounted for forty-five percent of the Nation's homicides.' 52 Between 1981 and
1982 fifteen southern states were in the top twenty-three for per capita murder
rates.1
53
In addition to its higher rate of homicides, scholars generally concede that
the South is more lawless than the rest of the Nation. "The South has a long-
standing reputation for violence and criminal disorder."' 154 A recent book on
nineteenth century southern crime concludes that "[c]rime and punishment, as
much as anything, measure the continuity of the South with the past: the region
still leads the nation in homicide and assault rates, still holds the greatest
number of men on death row, and still contains the largest number of hand-
guns."' 155 This pattern of crime began in the colonial period. In early eight-
eenth century Virginia "there was more crime than in other colonies, even those
with turbulent early modern cities and even more crime than in modern
America."'156 In fact, according to Peter Hoffer, in the early eighteenth century,
Richmond County had a higher homicide rate than New York City or the Col-
ony of Massachusetts.
157
Eighteenth century Virginia was following a pattern of violence that devel-
oped early in the seventeenth century. Cannibalism, the wanton slaughter of
Indians, and the incredibly severe punishments for whites who misbehaved are
part of the legacy of Virginia's first twenty years. 158 Virginia's early laws were
152. F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFoRM CRnm REPORTS 38-45 (1978). This statistic is
based on an inclusion of Missouri as a southern state, which is listed as a west north central state in
the UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS.
153. Id. at 44-49. The narrowing gap between homicides in the South and the rest of the Nation
does not necessarily indicate that southern culture is becoming less violent or that northern culture is
becoming more violent. Rather, the spread of violence to other parts of the Nation has been attrib-
uted to the migration of southerners. One writer has noted, "state homicide rates grade into one
another in rough approximation to the extent to which Southerners have moved into mixed [North-
South] states." R. GASTL, supra note 145, at 116. Gastil notes that one reason for a decline in
homicide rates may be that better medical care means victims who once would have died now live.
Id. at 109. The increased accuracy and power of weapons, however, may undercut that theory. See
Brown, Southern Violence-Regional Problem or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward South-
era Homicide in Historical Perspective, 32 VAND. L. REv. 225, 226 (1979) (Several commentators
"imply that at least with regard to violence there has been a southernization of America and that this
trend has been basic to America's traditionally high homicide rate.").
154. Ely & Bodenhamer, supra note 58, at 17.
155. E. AYERS, supra note 56, at 276. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, virtually all
executions have been in the South. As of August 1, 1985, nearly a third of all prisoners on death row
were in two southern states-Florida (221 death row inmates) and Texas (211 death row inmates).
Almost all of the 47 executions in the United States since 1977 have been in the South, with 13
executions in Florida and nine in Texas. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, § 1, at 9, col. 1. According to
the New York Times, "[s]outhern states have generally been more likely than others to impose the
death penalty." Id.
Reverend Joseph B. Ingle, Director of the Southern Coalition on Jails, commented that, with
the exception of six clemencies granted by Governor Bob Graham of Florida, "to the best of my
knowledge, no other Southern governor has granted a single clemency in a capital case." Despite the
six clemencies, Governor Graham "has also signed 108 death warrants, more than any governor in
the history of the United States." July 5, 1985, Letter to the Editor from Reverend Joseph G. Ingle,
id., July 14, 1985, § 4, at E26, col. 4.
156. Hoffer, Disorder and Deference The Paradoxes of Criminal Justice in the Colonial Tidewa-
ter, in AI mwVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 187, 188.
157. Id. at 189-90.
158. See E. MORGAN, supra note 62, at 73-4.
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harsh, even by seventeenth century standards. These laws fostered little com-
passion for human life. Under Dale's Laws the death penalty was available for
almost any crime, including lying, sacrilege, blasphemy, taking food while weed-
ing a garden, or killing chickens.159 In 1624 Richard Barnes was sentenced to
"have his arms broken, and his tongue bored through with a awl" for his "de-
tracting speeches concerning the Governor" and similarly disrespectful state-
ments about other leaders of the colony. 16° The court next ordered that he
"pass through a guard of 40 men and [be] butted by every one of them, and att
the head of the troope be kicked downe and footed out of the forte." 161
Postcolonial criminal law may be one area in which clear doctrinal differ-
ences developed between the South and the rest of the Nation. "The South's
historic subculture of violence and community tolerance of killing in personal
disputes" 162 made prosecutions of killers difficult. In Grainger v. State163 John
Catron, a justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court,164 overturned the conviction
of Grainger, who had killed an unarmed assailant. Catron asserted that if
Grainger thought he was likely to be harmed severely by his assailant, then he
acted in self-defense. 165 Grainger, described as a cowardly and timid man, had
been chased to his cabin by Broach, a local bully. Grainger, with his back to the
cabin wall, shot and killed Broach.166 These facts suggest that the outcome in
Grainger was reasonable.
Although the Grainger court may have reached a reasonable result, the
Grainger precedent became "a gigantic loophole through which a guilty killer
could be acquitted by pleading self-defense." 167 For the next half-century, hun-
dreds of murderers in the South and Southwest escaped punishment by pleading
self-defense in reliance on Grainger.68 While the Grainger rule swept through
the South, however, the New York Court of Appeals in Shorter v. People169
explicitly rejected it. The New York court held that it was "not enough that the
party believed himself in danger, unless the facts and circumstances were such
that the jury [could] say he had reasonable grounds for his belief." 170
159. Id. at 80. Dales Laws refers to the martial law imposed by Sir Thomas Dale in colonial
Virginia. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
160. MnTrrEs, supra note 74, at 14.
161. Id.
162. Brown, supra note 153, at 231.
163. 13 Tenn. 377, 5 Yer. 458 (1830).
164. Catron later served on the United States Supreme Court from 1837 to 1865.
165. Judge Catron stated:
If the jury had believed that Grainger was in danger of great bodily harm from Broach, or
thought himself so, then the killing would have been in self-defense. But if he thought
Broach intended to commit a battery upon him less violent, to prevent which he ldlled
Broach, it was manslaughter.
Grainger, 13 Tenn. at 380, 5 Yer. at 462.
166. Id. at 378-79, 5 Yer. at 460-61.
167. Brown, supra note 153, at 232.
168. Id. at 237-38 (quoting Ex Parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673 (1856)).
169. 2 N.Y. 193 (1849).
170. Id. at 201.
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An 1856 Mississippi case, Exparte Wray, 171 further separated northern and
southern criminal law. Richard Maxwell Brown, in his essay on violence and
southern legal history, asserts that Wray "blatantly expanded the common law
doctrine of self-defense" and "in effect gave judicial approval to street-fight kill-
ing."' 172 Brown believes that Wray may have led to Mississippi's high homicide
rate throughout the rest of the century. 173 The reasoning of the court in Wray
was not followed in New York.174 A careful analysis of nineteenth century
American courts probably would demonstrate that Grainger and Wray were fol-
lowed more in the South than in the North.
Another striking development in criminal law concerns the common-law
doctrine of the "duty of retreat." Richard Maxwell Brown notes that "no state
has exceeded Texas in its espousal of the stand-one's-ground doctrine" and in
rejection of the duty to retreat doctrine. 17 5 In fact, the "stand-one's-ground"
doctrine is sometimes called the "Texas rule" because only Texas has codified
it. 176 Although the Model Penal Code explicitly rejects this doctrine,177 a ma-
jority of states has adopted it. 178 With some irony Brown refers to the adoption
of the "Texas rule" as "the Americanization of the common law of homi-
cide."'179 Here then is at least one instance where southern doctrine has influ-
enced national law.
In addition to differing crime rates and criminal law doctrine, the North
and South differed in their enforcement of criminal laws and punishment of
crime. Southern penal institutions differed from those in the North. The history
of penal institutions is, for the nineteenth century, primarily a northern his-
tory.180 The penitentiary movement began in the North with the Walnut Street
prison in Philadelphia in 1790.181 This first wave of prison building was fol-
lowed by a second, more dramatic wave led by New York and Pennsylvania.' 8 2
Much of the South followed their lead.
183
171. 30 Miss. 673 (1856).
172. Brown, supra note 153, at 233.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
175. Brown, supra note 153, at 246.
176. Id.
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("The use of deadly
force is not justifiable. . . if. . .the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force
with complete safety by retreating .. ).
178. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir.) (indicating that in "a majority of
American jurisdictions, contrarily to the common law rule, one may stand his ground and use deadly
force whenever it seems reasonably necessary to save himself."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973).
For examples of northern adoption of the "Texas rule," see People v. Williams, 56 M1. App. 2d 159,
205 S.E.2d 749 (1965).
179. Brown, supra note 153, at 244.
180. E. AYERs, supra note 56, at 34-35.
181. Id. at 37-38; B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A STuDY IN AMERICAN SOCiAL HIs-
TORY PRIOR TO 1915, at 6-7 (1936).
182. E. AYERs, supra note 56, at 34.
183. Id. at 34-35. "In the 1820s New York and Pennsylvania began a movement that soon
spread through the Northeast, and then over the next decade to many midwestern states." D.
RoTHmAN, TnE DiscovERY OF THE AsYLuM: SocIAL ORDER AND DISORDER N THE NEw RE-
PunLc 79 (1971). The centerpieces of this movement were the massive penitentiaries at Cherry Hill,
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The nineteenth century North, concerned about reforming criminals and
protecting society, experienced a vibrant prison reform movement beginning in
the 1830s. 184 The South, however, "from a penological point of view never re-
ally belonged to the Union." 185 As Edward Ayers has noted, the ante-bellum
South never truly accepted penitentiaries and prisons, even though many south-
em states built them. Southern opposition to the system was strong, and in
some states, like North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida, no penitentiaries
were built before the Civil War.18 6 The North was willing to fund prisons,
reformatories, special institutions for minors, and parole boards. The South, by
contrast, initially was unwilling to spend money on prisons and reform, but the
potential value of prison labor ultimately proved irresistible. Indeed, "[s]ickened
at being forced to spend money on convicted felons, Virginia, Georgia, and Ten-
nessee toyed with the idea of leasing their penitentiaries to businessmen in the
late 1850s."187 Although profits were certainly an incentive for the North's ex-
perimentation with prison labor, the main purpose was to reform prisoners. 188
In the ante-bellum period the use of prison labor in the South for manufac-
turing, agriculture, and mining led to the development and persistence of the
chain gang, the prison farm, the convict lease system, and prison labor. Edward
Ayers points out that "[t]he evolution of the convict lease system traces the
contours of the evolving Southern economy in general." 189 Thus, the lease sys-
tem connects southern criminal justice with the emergence of the New South
economy. Although the South may have been hostile to corporations, 190 the
penal system aided investors who sought cheap and certain labor.191
Pennsylvania, and Auburn, New York, and the Sing Sing prison outside New York City. These
giant penitentiaries and the experiments in penology and reformation through incarceration at-
tracted world-wide attention. B. McKELvEY, supra note 181, at 16-17. David Rothman observes:
Tourists with no special interest in penology made sure to visit the institutions. Harriet
Martineau, Frederick Marryat, and Basil Hall would no more have omitted this stop from
their itinerary than they would have a southern plantation, a Lowell textile mill, or a fron-
tier town. By the 1830s, the American penitentiary had become world famous.
D. RoTN , supra, at 81. Another indication of the importance of these institutions is that Massa-
chusetts' prison admission fee of $.25 (about a quarter of a day's pay for a laborer) generated more
than $1,500 a year for the prison. M. HINDUS, supra note 37, at 169, 170 n.24.
184. See B. McKELvEY, supra note 181, at 16-21; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 183, at 81-82. The
only southern resident to participate in the debate over prison reform was Francis Lieber, a German
refugee on the faculty of the University of South Carolina. Lieber, an internationally respected legal
scholar and penologist, also led the fight in South Carolina to create a penitentiary system to replace
the local jails. Lieber's liberalism and antislavery sympathies probably made his support for a peni-
tentiary system in South Carolina counterproductive. "The association of reform with abolitionism
and Unionism" was "blamed for South Carolina's recalcitrance" in the prison reform issue. M.
HIDus, supra note 37, at 216. In the 1850s Lieber was forced to leave South Carolina because his
views, especially those concerning slavery, were no longer tolerated at the University of South
Carolina.
185. B. MCKELVEY, supra note 181, at 172.
186. E. AYEs, supra note 56, at 34-72.
187. Id. at 67.
188. M. HINDus, supra note 37, at 165, 170.
189. E. AYEns, supra note 56, at 191.
190. See supra note 58.
191. The "lease system became a sort of mutual aid society of the new breed of capitalists and
politicians of the white Democratic regimes of the New South" because officeholders were also the
employers of convict labor. E. AYEs, supra note 56, at 195.
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In 1879 E.C. Wines characterized the convict lease system-the practice of
leasing prisoners to industrialists at a profit-in Georgia as "the destruction of
the penitentiary system of imprisonment." 192 The penitentiary system "pro-
duces, or aims to produce, penitence,-sorrow for past offences, and an amended
life in the future."' 193 This goal, however, could not be achieved in Georgia,
where about twelve hundred prisoners were leased to companies that were free
to treat prisoners as they wished. 194 Georgia collected about twenty-five dollars
a year for each leased prisoner.1 95 Florida had the "same lease system. . . as in
Georgia," 196 but it collected $100 per year for each leased convict.1 97 Similar
penal conditions existed in the rest of the Deep South.198 In Texas, Wines found
that "the agencies of [prison] discipline [were] labor, the dungeon, the lash, and
the stocks ... ,"199 Conditions changed little in the first half of the twentieth
century when southern states maintained large prison farms and some engaged
in manufacturing and mining operations with convict labor.
20°
The North differed substantially from the South in its treatment of con-
victed criminals. Prison labor in Massachusetts was designed to reform the
criminal, although it sometimes profited the state as well.20 1 Prison labor and
corporal punishment disappeared from Massachusettes by the Civil War.20 2 As
late as 1890, however, stocks and whipping posts could be found in southern
jails. Furthermore, the chain gang, with its whips, dogs, guards, and chains,
continued beyond the mid-twentieth century. The conclusions of Blake McKel-
vey's pioneering study of a half century ago remain unchallenged.
[The South's] halting developments looking toward a penitentiary sys-
tem had been cut short by the Civil War, and the turmoil of recon-
struction created social and economic problems and standards of
cruelty that have since continued to vilify the penal practices of the
South. While the northern prisoner may have grown pale and anemic
gazing through the bars in the pale dusk of towering cell blocks, his
southern brother dragged his chains through long years of hard labor,
driven by brutal physical torture, oftentimes to his grave. A half-cen-
tury was not sufficient to efface this institutional estrangement.
20 3
Northerners thought, or at least wanted to believe, that their prisons could
reform inmates. The South, however, imprisoned criminals to punish them and
remove them from society. This difference may explain why the South seems to
have used the pardon more frequently than the North. Pardons in the South
192. E.C. WINES, THE STATE OF PRISONS AND OF CHILD-SAVING INSTITUTIONS IN THE CIvi-
rUZeD WORLD 191 (1880).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 192.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id. at 195.
198. Id. at 195-213.
199. Id. at 189.
200. F. HAYNES, THE AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEM 177-206 (1939).
201. See, eg., M. HINDus, supra note 37, at 164.
202. See id. at 173 (discussion of abolition of corporal punishment).
203. B. MCKELVEY, supra note 181, at 172.
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were based on mercy, whereas parole in the North assumed reformation. Robert
Ireland argues that Kentucky governors "became a court of last resort. ' ' 2° 4 Ed-
ward Ayers finds that governors were "besieged by petitions for pardon, '20 5 and
apparently many were granted. Requests for pardons were also a problem for
governors in the ante-bellum North, but the results were different. Rather than
granting pardons wholesale as some southern states did, northern states experi-
mented with various kinds of parole that led to the indeterminate sentence. Un-
like the South, where pardon was strictly a political action, the North developed
an administrative process for pardon and parole.20 6 The North was able to
adopt pardon and parole earlier than the South in part because the North had no
financial incentive to keep convicts incarcerated. Indeed, the incentive in the
North was to reform prisoners and parole them. By the early twentieth century
northern states were willing to spend resources on parole officers, boards of par-
don, and other mechanisms to reward good behavior through early release.
20 7
With chain gangs building roads, prison laborers supplying the state with coal
and furniture, prison farms supplying food to some state institutions, and the
prison lease system providing cash revenues, southern states were less interested
in the early release of prisoners.
After World War II most of the South abandoned the chain gang and the
prison lease. Prison conditions, however, did not improve markedly. In a
number of recent cases, federal courts have concluded that prison conditions in
Arkansas, 20 8 Alabama, 20 9 Florida,2 10 and Texas 2 11 violated the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama refused to comply
with the orders of the federal court, and that state's prison system was put into
receivership.
2 12
Prisons, penitentiaries, parole boards, and special courts for children are
not the only institutions that a legal system creates. The other kinds of legal
institutions, both formal and informal, that developed in the South also deserve
examination. A study of southern legal institutions and culture suggests other
areas for research and exploration in the search for a southern legal history.
C. Southern Legal Institutions and Legal Culture
The South traditionally has had fewer formal institutions than the rest of
204. Ireland, Law and Disorder in Nineteenth Century Kentucky, 32 VAND. L. REv. 281, 295
(1979).
205. E. Aymns, supra note 56, at 63.
206. See, eg., An Act in Relation to Pardons, 1849 N.Y. Laws 450; Chute, The Development of
Probation in the United States, in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JusncnE 225-49 (S. Glueck ed. 1938).
207. F. HAYNES, supra note 200, at 335-65.
208. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 206 (8th Cir. 1974).
209. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd and remanded sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
210. Miller v. Corson, 563 F.2d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1977).
211. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) (discussing cruel and unusual punishment); see also
Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980) (attacking conditions in El Paso jails).
212. Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 639 (M.D. Ala. 1979); see also Henry v. Van Cleve,
469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972) (attacking racial discrimination in Alabama prisons).
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the Nation. While southerners may be noted for their formalities, the South has
not been noted for its formalism. The South's lack of formalism affected its legal
history in two ways. First, it led to the existence of fewer and weaker legal
institutions than in the North;213 second, it led to a legal culture that was less
formal and less scholarly than that of the North.
The colonial South's development differed from that of New England,
where formalism and legalism were more important and where other institutions
and factors-churches, an emerging school system, close family ties, greater ur-
banization or at least shorter distances between farms and communities-led to
social control. The lack of institutions2 14 in the early South dictated that force,
economic power, and deference govern. "Dale's Laws' 215 were necessary for
Virginia's governance precisely because the colony was ungovernable except by
martial law, which Sir Thomas Dale imposed.
2 16
Because there were so few institutions in the colonial South, the institutions
that did develop became more important than their counterparts in other re-
gions. The significance of the colonial South's county court system resulted
from the absence of competing institutions. In colonial North Carolina the most
important division of government was the county, and the "pivotal factor of the
county administration .. .was the county court. ' 2 17 In colonial Virginia
"there were few institutions that could maintain order and harmony in soci-
ety"; 218 thus, the colony's county courts may have been more important than
similar institutions in the North because they could exert enough force to main-
tain order. The order established by the courts, however, was not maintained by
"the rule of law" or by a community-wide acceptance of legal institutions.
Rather, the power of the county courts rested on the importance of the men who
ran them. As Peter Hoffer has noted, "the personnel of the county court bench
gave local justice legitimacy and continuity." 219 Early Virginia developed a
legal system that "depended upon the personal authority of the justices"; there-
fore, "the elevation of the influential planters to the local bench was sensible and
expedient."'220 North Carolina's magistrates were chosen in much the same
way.22 1 Indeed, Virginia set a pattern for justice and court administration that
was followed throughout the South.
222
The politics of the county courthouse-common to the South of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries-have their roots in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. According to A.G. Roeber, "[b]etween the Restoration of
213. See P. WAGER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACROSS THE NATION 344-54 (1950).
214. See W. GuEss, COUNTY GOvERNMENT IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA 14-16 (1911).
215. E. MORGAN, supra note 62, at 72-74; Konig, Dale's Laws, supra note 63.
216. The authority of a nobleman such as Dale was necessary to make the colonists work and
survive. Konig, Dale's Laws, supra note 63.
217. W. Gusss, supra note 214, at 18.
218. Hoffer, supra note 156, at 197.
219. Hoffer, Introduction to CRBINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL. VIRGINA xviii (P. Hoffer
& W. Scott eds. 1984).
220. Id.
221. See W. Gtmss, supra note 214, at 23-24.
222. See P. WAGER, supra note 213, at 344.
1985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the Stuart monarchy and the American Revolution, the Old Dominion devel-
oped a self-perpetuating county magistracy that dominated every aspect of the
province's life through the structural mechanism of the county court. ' ' 223 The
development of strong county courts in colonial Virginia apparently was repli-
cated by Kentucky in the nineteenth century. Robert Ireland has concluded
that in ante-bellum Kentucky "[t]he county courts affected the people. . . more
profoundly than any other governmental institution.
22 4
The importance of local courts and local justice reinforced the tradition of
localism that developed as part of the South's legal history. Localism also
emerged because of the structure of southern slave and plantation society.
Planters did not want to be bothered by institutions or centralized authorities.
Because the planters were also the judges, the courts of the early South devel-
oped into unusually local institutions. Furthermore, the strictly limited jurisdic-
tion of the more centralized courts in colonial Virginia allowed these local
planters to administer justice as they saw fit. "In theory, the local courts were
subordinate to the central courts of the colony, '225 but in practice the local
courts did as they pleased, often controlling the litigation that would reach the
centralized courts in Williamsburg.
2 2 6
Southern colonial courts gained additional power because they often func-
tioned as administrative and legislative bodies. The courts, acting as quasi-legis-
lative bodies, helped create slavery through the sentencing of black indentured
servants to lifetime servitude.227 This colonial heritage continued into the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. In nineteenth century Kentucky, for example,
"the business of the county courts was substantial, encompassing executive, leg-
islative, and judicial fumctions. '228 The Kentucky county courts in that period
levied taxes and oversaw the maintenance of roads and bridges.229 Although
northern jurisdictions developed institutions and boards to provide for indi-
223. A. ROEBER, supra note 63, at xv.
224. P. IRELAND, THE COUNTY COURTS IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY 171 (1972).
225. Hoffer, supra note 219, at xvii.
226. Id. at xviii.
227. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. In the colonial South "the county govern-
ment, in the hands of the justices of the peace, monopolized local government." J. FERRELL,
COUNTY GovERNmENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1963).
228. IL IRELAND, supra note 224, at 18. The Missouri Constitution of 1875 empowered Mis-
souri county judges to "transact all county and such business as may be prescribed by law." Mo.
CONST. of 1875, art. VI, § 36. In North Carolina, the courts were described as follows:
[Until 1968, the] work of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions was dual in nature.
Although called a court-and it did perform judicial functions-it also had administrative
duties. Thus, the justices were responsible for assessing and levying taxes; and they were
charged with establishing and maintaining roads, bridges, and quarries; they granted
licenses to taverns and controlled the prices charged for food; and they were responsible for
the erection and control of mills. Through the powers of appointment. . . they supervised
the work of the law enforcement officers, the administrative officers of the court, the sur-
veyor, and the wardens of the poor. Taxes were collected by the sheriff [who was ap-
pointed by the court].
J. FERRELL, supra note 227, at 4. The Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions was made up ofjustices
of the peace appointed in each county. Id.
229. J. F R.L., supra note 227, at 35-61.
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gents, 230 southern jurisdictions more often relied on the county courts to oversee
the feeding and clothing of the poor.23 1 Thus, in the ante-bellum period the job
of "judge" was more than simply a judicial one. To date, remnants of this sys-
tem survive in Kentucky,2 32 and some southern county courts continue to func-
tion as county legislatures and county boards.
2 33
The heritage of the colonial courts also affected the nature of the southern
legal profession. Although lawyers have always been unpopular in Anglo-
American culture, 23 4 "the practice of law has been regarded as an attractive
profession throughout the history of the South." 235 Lawyers in the eighteenth
century South apparently were respected more than their counterparts in New
York or New England.236 The legal profession also may have been more attrac-
tive to young men on the rise in the South than in the North. In the colonial
North divinity and commerce provided options for many bright and talented
young men. For Southerners, these options were either less available or less
attractive.
The attractiveness of the bar may explain why the South initially led the
nation in two critical areas of legal culture: education and scholarship.237 The
230. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 183, at 155-205.
231. See, eg., R. IRELAND, supra note 224, at 24 ("[Mlost courts appear simply to have assigned
to each poor person a responsible citizen of the community through whom funds were channeled.").
232. Id. at 174-75.
233. Harry Truman's career illustrates the many-faceted nature of county judges in the South.
As presiding judge of the Jackson County Court, Truman became famous, not for his judicial deci-
sions, but for his honest administration of public works projects. See A. STEINBERG, THE MAN
FROM MISsouRI: THE LwE AND TMES OF HARRY S. TRuMAN 66-109 (1962). "Several states,
mostly in the South, retain the word 'court' in the title [of the county's governing body] even though
the body now possesses few, if any, of its historic functions as a court." P. WAGER, supra note 213,
at 11.
234. Shakespeare's suggestion that all lawyers be killed, Henry the Sixth, Part H, Act IV, scene
2, line 70 ('But first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."), is just one of his many statements
attacking lawyers. Shakespeare's popularity suggests that he appealed to the sentiments of the six-
teenth century. Daniel Boorstin correctly observed that the "ancient English prejudice against law-
yers secured new strength in America" where "distrust of lawyers became an institution." D.
BooRmsN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 197 (1958). Most of the seventeenth
century American colonies prohibited the practice of law. See generally 1 A. CuRousT, THE RisE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 27-29, 65-80 (1965) (discussing colonial attitudes towards
lawyers and the regulation of legal practice by colonial legislatures). As Lawrence Friedman notes,
"[i]f lawyers were an evil, they were.., a necessary evil"; by the end of the seventeenth century
they were allowed to practice law in most places. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 83.
235. Ely & Bodenhamer, supra note 58, at 15.
236. The comments of John Adams, before he became a lawyer, underscore the latent hostility
to lawyers among the descendants of Puritans. Four months before he began his clerkship, John
Adams wrote to a classmate at Harvard:
"Let us look upon a Lawyer .... In the beginning of Life we see him, fumbling and
raking amidst the rubbish of Writs, indightments, Pleas, ejectments, enfiefed, illaterbration
and 1000 other lignum Vitae words that have neither harmony nor meaning. When he gets
into Business he often foments more quarrells than he composes, and inriches himself at
the expense of impoverishing others more honest and deserving than himself. Besides the
noise and bustle of Courts and the labour of inquiring into and pleading dry and difficult
Cases, have very few Charms in my Eye."
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS lii (K. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1965). Alexander Hamilton,
always less verbose than Adams, expressed similar ambivalence about the morality of his chosen
profession. In 1782 Hamilton wrote his friend Lafayette that he was "studying the art of fleecing my
neighbours." 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 192 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
237. Southerners in the colonial period went to England for their legal training more often than
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College of William and Mary appointed America's first law professor, George
Wythe, in 1779. While "chairs in law at the colleges expanded rapidly" after the
appointment of Wythe, 238 the specific role of these law professors remains un-
clear. The one exception was at the University of Virginia, where "[l]aw teach-
ing... was seen as an integral part of the undergraduate curriculum, designed
to form the statesman, legislator, and judge no doubt of the appropriate Whig
outlook. '239 "[Tihe 'Southern tradition' of law teaching was, in general,
broader than the north's."24'
Upon his retirement from William and Mary, George Wythe opened a pro-
prietary law school in Richmond, but its success was marginal. Scores of propri-
etary law schools opened and closed in the early national and ante-bellum
periods, but none achieved the fame of the Litchfield Law School in Connecti-
cut, which dominated legal education until it closed in 1833. Coincidentally, it
was at this time that Harvard Law School emerged as an important force in legal
education. Some of the proprietary law schools, such as Judge Battle's school at
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, survived by affiliating with state universities.241
Although Battle's school at Chapel Hill attracted students from throughout the
South, it never dominated legal education in the region.242 North Carolina ap-
pointed a law professor in the 1840s, "but it was not until the 1870s that law
students were even regarded as on par with 'real' undergraduates and not until
the 1890s that the law professor was paid by salary rather than through student
fees." 243 By the end of the ante-bellum period the only national law school was
at Harvard; southern legal education no longer competed with that of the North.
As in legal education, the South initially led the nation in legal scholarship,
with the publication of St. George Tucker's edition of Blackstone. This volume
was not simply an American printing of Blackstone, but an edition of Blackstone
to fit American circumstances, needs, and constitutional developments. 244
Whether this early lead had a permanent effect on southern legal culture
remains unclear. By midcentury the South had been surpassed by the North in
legal education and legal scholarship. Although he exaggerated southern hostil-
ity to legal technicalities, Daniel J. Boorstin accurately noted the lack of south-
ern legal scholarship:
During the very years when a technical American legal system with its
paraphernalia of law schools, printed judicial precedents, and profes-
sional textbooks was developing in New England, Southerners came
more and more to live by unwritten law. Legal technicalities, the letter
of the law, and the items in small print, they said, were for pettifogging
northerners. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 84. This practice may have led to a better educated
and more scholarly bar in the South in the colonial period.
238. R. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 4.
239. Id. at 5.
240. Id.
241. 2 A. CHRousr, supra note 234, at 215.
242. Id. at 209.
243. R. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 78.




In short, the striking thing about southern legal culture in the nineteenth cen-
tury is how little of it there was.
Southern legal scholarship lagged behind the North throughout the nine-
teenth century. The region's best legal scholar, Francis Lieber, was a German
refugee who was forced to leave South Carolina because of his antislavery con-
victions.246 Other legal scholars may have found little support for their work.
Thomas R.R. Cobb, for example, felt it necessary to publish his treatise on slave
law in Philadelphia as well as Savannah. 247 Cobb merely followed the lead of St.
George Tucker, who had published his American edition of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries in Philadelphia.24 8 Also indicative of the corrosive effect of slavery on
southern legal scholarship is the fact that Tucker published his proposal for the
gradual abolition of slavery in the North.24 9 By midcentury there were few if
any treatises produced in the South; the cutting edge of doctrinal change and
intellectual curiousity was in the North.2 50 Thus, northern legal culture became
dynamic while legal culture in the South stagnated. Southerners went north to
study law at Litchfield 251 and Harvard, but northerners did not go south.
Southern conservatism persisted in the ante-bellum period, and the failure
to produce law teachers and scholars continued. The South's smaller pool of
potential students may have discouraged the founding of law schools, but the
lack of a strong tradition of education in the South also had its effects. Further-
more, the energies of leading southerners in the ante-bellum period were di-
rected to politics and the defense of slavery. Law teaching was not a high
priority for the leading legal minds of the South. The fate of the Lumpkin Law
School in Georgia is illustrative. The founder of the Lumpkin Law School in
Georgia, Joseph P. Lumpkin, was a former chief justice of the Georgia Supreme
Court. The school opened its doors in October 1859. A key to the school's
success was Thomas R.R. Cobb, Lumpkin's son-in-law, the reporter for the
Georgia Supreme Court and one of the South's pre-eminent legal theorists. In
245. D. BOoRSTN, supra note 113, at 199.
246. See supra note 184. In the period before 1840 a number of other books d*aling directly with
southern law were published in the North. They included J. GRMKyA THE SouTH CAROLINA JUS-
TICE OF THE PEACE (Philadelphia 2d ed. 1796), J. LOMOX, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF REAL PROP-
ERTY IN VIRGINIA (Philadelphia 1839) (three volume work), and W. SCHLEY, DIGEST OF ENGLISH
STATUTES IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA (Philadelphia 1826).
247. T.R..L COBB, supra note 115.
248. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARmS: WITH NoTEs OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUION
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF VIRGINIA (S. Tucker ed. Philadelphia 1803).
249. S. TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABo-
LIrION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Philadelphia 1796).
250. Jenni Parrish in her article, Parrish, Law Books and Legal Publishing in America 1760-
1840, 72 L. LIBRARY J. 355 (1979), has compiled an exhaustive list of 565 law books published in the
United States between 1760 and 1840. Of these 565 books, only 74 were published in the South.
251. Cf. R. STEvENs, supra note 42, at 3-4 (indicating Litchfield attracted students from
throughout the United States). John C. Calhoun may have been Litchfield's most famous graduate.
Students from all over the Union attended Litchfield, including 70 Georgians, 45 South Carolinians,
and "a fair number" from Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Louisiana. 2 A. CHROUST,
supra note 234, at 214. There is no indication that northern students attended southern proprietary
law schools.
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1860 Cobb wrote Georgia Congressman Alexander Stephens that "No office can
draw me away from the 'Lumpkin Law School' until it becomes a 'fixed
fact'."'2 52 Within a year, however, Cobb would join Stephens in forming the
Confederacy. As Cobb's biographer notes: "Unfortunately, his dedication to
the cause of disunion was stronger than" his dedication to the law school.
253
Throughout 1860 and early 1861 Cobb neglected his teaching for secessionist
politics. By April 1861 the Lumpkin Law School was defunct.
254
The slower development of southern law schools persisted into the twenti-
eth century. In one survey only six southern law schools ranked in the top forty,
but sixteen ranked in the bottom forty.255 In addition, legal education is domi-
nated by professors who were trained at northern law schools.
256
The underdevelopment of law schools in the South may explain why south-
ern judges were less educated than their mid-western counterparts.2 7 Southern
conservatism helps explain why southern judges stayed in office longer than
judges in other regions.258 In colonial North Carolina the royal governor
"seems to have made his appointments [of county judges] from the prominent
individuals of the county, particularly those who were active in the militia, the
vestry and the local and provincial courts. '259 Kermit Hall's study of the south-
ern judiciary suggests that the personal and class nature of politics and law in
the South continued into the twentieth century. "Southern politics and society
combined to fashion a distinctive judicial culture. The values of that culture
emphasized independence, prior education and training, provincialism, defer-
ence to authority, and respect for ties of blood and marriage."'26° The judges of
Hall's nineteenth century South were similar to the county judges of Peter
Hoffer's eighteenth century South. In both periods judges were usually planters
whose economic power and familial connections made them community leaders.
Hall's analysis also may help to explain why little legal innovation came from
the southern benches. "For better or worse the southern appellate judiciary was
less the creature of a particular method of selection and more the image of the
social order it served."
2 61
Mary K. Tachau's work on Kentucky's federal courts supports the conclu-
sion that southern justice was often based on personalities, family ties, and pres-
tige. The judges on the federal bench in Kentucky were "men whose families or
whose own reputations were known personally to the presidents who appointed
252. W. McCAsH, supra note 35, at 129.
253. Id.
254. Id. The school was later resurrected as the University of Georgia School of Law.
255. J. GoRMAN, THE GORMAN REPOP.T: A RATING OF GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL PRO-
GRAMS IN AMERICAN AND INTERNATONAL UNIVERSrrES 71-75 (1973).
256. See R. STEVENS, supra note 42, at 287 n.83.
257. See Hall, The "Route to Hell" Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the Southern
Appellate Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 250.
258. Id. at 242.
259. P. McCAiN, THE COUNTY COURT IN NoRTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1750, at 24 (1954).
260. K. HALi, supra note 5, at 251.
261. Id. at 252.
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them."'262 The presidents understood that only men from the right kind of fami-
lies could become leaders on the bench, especially in a state that treated the
federal courts with unusual hostility.263 Tachau credits Judge Harry Innes with
making the system work because of his prestige and personality. But family ties
helped. The appointment of Thomas Todd of Kentucky to the United States
Supreme Court made the circuit run even better because "Todd was respected
and popular in Kentucky" and, equally as important, he "was a younger cousin
of Judge Innes and had been his student and prot6g6
'' 264
A social and legal system that depended on family ties and personalities
helped define legal culture in the South. Moreover, social and legal order itself
thrived on localism. Southern localism sometimes emerged as hostility toward
the federal government, the ultimate outcome of which was secession. When
this constitutional theory was demolished by the inexorable arguments of Gener-
als Grant and Sherman,265 it reemerged as a less militaristic, but no less mili-
tant, theory of states' rights. Southern arguments for states' rights and localism
have helped shape American constitutional law, despite the fact that these theo-
ries have rarely persuaded the United States Supreme Court.
266
Southern localism has not been directed at the federal government alone. It
also has produced xenophobia toward other states and their citizens. The ante-
bellum crisis led southern jurists to denounce northern legislatures, courts, and
citizens. In Mitchell v. Wells2 67 the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Ap-
peals refused to allow a black resident of Ohio to recover a legacy from her
deceased former owner, who had voluntarily manumitted her in Ohio. 268 The
Mississippi court asserted that Ohio was "forgetful of her constitutional obliga-
tions to the whole race, and afflicted with a negro-mania, which inclines her to
descend, rather than elevate herself in the scale of humanity" because of Ohio's
willingness to allow the emancipation of slaves within the state.269 Hostility
toward other states continued after the Civil War. John V. Orth's essay on the
Virginia state debt indicates the lengths to which one state was willing to go to
avoid paying its obligations.270 Southern localism also produced intra-south
disputes. For example, in 1847 a Georgia legislator opposed a proposal to build
a railroad from central Georgia to Charleston, South Carolina, declaring that he
"hoped to live long enough to see an impassable gulf or Chinese Wall between
Georgia and South Carolina, that we may be forever separated from her arro-
262. M. TACHAU, FEDERAL CouRTs iN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789-1816, at 15-
16 (1978).
263. The main cause of the hostility was the use of federal courts to enforce federal taxes on
whiskey. Id. at 23-25.
264. Id. at 27.
265. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 27, at 203-78; W. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIoG-
RAPHY (1980).
266. Two cases in which the Supreme Court was not persuaded by states' rights arguments are
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
267. 37 Miss. 235 (1859).
268. Nancy Wells was the daughter as well as the slave of her master. Id. at 236-37.
269. Id at 262-63 (emphasis added).
270. Orth, The Virginia State Debt and the Judicial Power of the United States, 1870-1920, in
AMBIVALENT LEGACY, supra note 4, at 106.
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gant medlers [sic]." 271
Most of all, the localism of southern legal history perpetuated the funda-
mental institutions of the South: slavery and racial discrimination. Localism
reflected a belief that no one--not the King in the colonial period, not the aboli-
tionists in the ante-bellum period, and not the federal government after Recon-
struction-should interfere with the institutions of the South. Southern legal
institutions, like so much else in the region, were geared to defend the "corner-
stone" of the society-slavery and the subsequent subordination of blacks.
272
V. ToWARDS A SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY
Crime, violence, prisons, local courts, legal education, institutional resist-
ance to change, laws concerning divorce and child custody, and the nature of the
southern bench are all fruitful avenues in the search for a distinctive southern
legal history. Southern judges and lawyers need biographers. The relationship
between legal doctrine in the South and in the North must be explored. Future
investigations will show that certain areas of southern legal history mirrored
developments in the North. Scholars, however, will find many areas of legal
history that are distinctly southern. Because the law of a region reflects the
culture of that region, scholars will find a distinctive southern legal history to
the extent that the culture of the South has diverged from the rest of the nation.
The culture of l:.ofessionalism may have fewer regional distinctions.
Southern lawyers were perhaps more aware of national trends than other
southerners. Some southern lawyers, especially in the twentieth century, may
have felt greater kinship with lawyers of other regions than with laymen of their
own region. In studying the legal profession, however, scholars must be aware
of those distinctively southern issues that prevented lawyers, judges, and law
makers in the South from parting company with their neighbors.
Most importantly scholars must be attuned to those areas of southern legal
history in which the law and legal institutions were used to protect or deny
equality. A study of the areas of law that do not involve equality and race may
lead to a southern legal history that can be unified with that of the rest of the
Nation. But when race is an issue-and in southern history it may be an issue
when least expected-Americans may discover the emergence of a truly distinc-
tive southern legal history. By understanding that legal heritage, lawyers,
judges, legislators, scholars, and voters may be able to use the law to preserve
and extend equality and to escape the burdens of the South's legal past.
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